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FOREWORD
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
has been one of the Russian Federation’s more visible
forays down the path of regional hegemony. Under
the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Moscow
has been promoting a series of increasingly ambitious Russian-led multilateral institutions. The CSTO
has helped restore Moscow’s military power in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Although originally
designed for mutual defense, CSTO members employ
the organization to counter transnational threats such
as cyber vulnerabilities, narcotics trafficking, transnational crime, and terrorism. Member countries further
collaborate on arms sales and manufacturing, military
facilities and training, regional security consultations,
and conducting joint military exercises. In addition,
the development of some permanent bodies in recent
years demonstrates increased integration among
CSTO members. Moscow uses the CSTO to pursue a
variety of goals such as power projection, legitimation of its policies, and constraints on member states.
Although Russia dominates the CSTO, the organization is weak. Its member governments continue to
disagree on important issues and have failed to act in
Ukraine or Syria. The weakness of the CSTO has hindered Russia’s ability to pursue its goals through the
organization and provides an opening for skilled U.S.
leadership.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
consists of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, and Tajikistan. The CSTO’s membership has
been stable, with the exception that Uzbekistan, which
joined the organization in 2006, withdrew in 2012. The
CSTO operates on the basis of the Collective Security
Treaty (CST), a mutual defense pact signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on May 15, 1992. The CSTO’s initial
declared purpose was to counter external aggression
against members and to harmonize their foreign policy
stances. The organization has since addressed subconventional challenges such as cyber threats, transnational terrorism, ethnic unrest, narcotics trafficking,
humanitarian emergencies, and peacekeeping. Many
CSTO members do not face immediate conventional
military threats from other nation-states, but do confront transnational challenges. They further benefit
from collaborating on joint weapons acquisition, training opportunities, and military exercises.
The CSTO’s joint command structure was originally designed to mobilize multinational coalitions
during wartime. The organization has since developed standing decision-making and advisory bodies
as well as additional types of military forces. These
include rapid reaction forces, comprised of members’
elite units, as well as special purpose forces for peacekeeping, drug interdiction, and other low-intensity
missions. The organization’s Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) is the main structure for addressing these new missions. Its components are in a higher
state of readiness than other CSTO units; they engage
in regular exercises, especially in Central Asia, where
the main transnational threats are concentrated. These
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drills rehearse the canonical scenario of resisting North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aggression as
well as the new sub-conventional missions. The CSTO
has also gained some international recognition, signing agreements with the United Nations, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), and other multinational organizations. During meetings, CSTO leaders
typically issue joint statements on various international
security issues to amplify the impact of their individual
views by speaking with a collective voice. These joint
declarations usually support Moscow’s stance but can
also back other members’ positions.
Russia is the CSTO’s dominant member, with the
largest economy, population, defense budget, and
armed forces. Moscow uses the CSTO to support its
foreign basing network in the former Soviet republic.
The organization helps justify Russian military presence in other former Soviet republics, which enhances
Moscow’s influence and provides a defensive buffer
from Russian state borders. The other CSTO members
also receive discounts, subsidies, and other incentives
to buy Russian arms, which promote military interoperability. Additionally, the Russian Government provides subsidized military education and training
opportunities to other CSTO members. This Russian
domination has weakened the CSTO’s institutional
legitimacy in the West. NATO members see the CSTO
as an instrument to sustain Russian defense primacy
in Eurasia. According to the CSTO Charter, members
cannot host foreign bases without the approval of all
other members, effectively giving Moscow a veto on
NATO military facilities in the CSTO region. The organization also helps limit Beijing’s military role in what
Moscow sees as its zone of security influence even as
the CSTO develops ties with the SCO.
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Notwithstanding Moscow’s institutional primacy,
CSTO member states regularly deviate from Russian
positions on some security issues, such as Moscow’s
creation of separatist states in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia following the August 2008 Georgian war and
Moscow’s military operations in Ukraine. In addition,
members have generally declined to back Armenia
in its territorial dispute with non-member Azerbaijan. Even when CSTO governments have called on
the organization to suppress domestic instability in a
member country, such as when mass violence broke
out between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the CSTO failed to take collective action.
Despite the persistent threats Afghanistan presents to
the organization, the CSTO has considerably restricted
its role regarding that conflict. For example, the organization helps interdict the influx of Afghan-origin
heroin into Central Asia and Russia, but has not supported NATO’s stabilization missions inside Afghanistan. Collaboration with other regional security bodies
has also been modest. Despite some interaction, the
CSTO and SCO exist as potentially competitive organizations. The CSTO’s internal divisions, shirking
of regional challenges, and lack of collective combat
experience cast doubt on the organization’s capability
and resolve to engage in actual operations. If relations
between NATO and Russia ever improve, opportunities may arise for cooperation on common security
concerns, such as securing the Afghanistan-Tajikistan
border, but for now, Washington and its allies should
focus on monitoring the organization’s activities and
challenging its claims to legitimacy and exclusivity.
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ASSESSING THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY
TREATY ORGANIZATION: CAPABILITIES
AND VULNERABILITIES
In recent years, Russia has strengthened its military position in Central Asia and the South Caucasus
through a combination of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, including by signing economic and security
agreements with the former Soviet republics and promoting the development of Moscow-led multinational
organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO). This monograph reviews the CSTO’s history,
structure, missions, capabilities, activities, members,
opportunities, and challenges, including the wars in
Afghanistan and Syria, as well as some suggestions for
future U.S. policies toward the institution. The CSTO
has become the most important multilateral defense
structure in the former Soviet Union. In the coming
years, however, the CSTO faces significant internal
and external challenges that could impede the realization of some of Moscow’s most important security
goals in Eurasia. Conversely, the United States and
its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies
have opportunities to sustain a regional defense role.
ORIGINS
On December 8, 1991, the new political leaders of
Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine signed an agreement that
officially recognized the Soviet Union’s dissolution
and established the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). Two weeks later, on December 21, representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and
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Uzbekistan joined the three original governments in
signing the Alma-Ata Protocol, which expanded the
number and legal authorities of the CIS. While Georgia entered the CIS 2 years later, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan did not ratify the CIS Charter and became
only associate members; the Baltic states of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania never joined.
The former Soviet republics derived benefits from
the Soviet Union’s demise, namely greater national
sovereignty and economic freedoms. However, they
suffered major economic, political, diplomatic, and
military costs. These states had to transition from a
socialist state-run command economy, based on an
integrated Soviet defense industrial complex, to a freer
but more complex mixed market economic system.
They also abruptly replaced their stifling but stable
communist political systems with more turbulent multiparty (at least on paper) political structures. Although
the former Soviet republics welcomed their newfound
independence, they found themselves excluded from
the core Euro-Atlantic institutions of the European
Union (EU), which admitted only the three Baltic
republics. The CIS lacked the strong structures and
authorities found in these Western institutions or in the
defunct Soviet Union. Perhaps the best analogy for the
CIS (and possible role model) is the British Commonwealth, which likewise seeks to sustain links between
newly independent states and their former mother
country. Their mutual disagreements prevented them
from forming an equivalently strong bloc of their own.
On May 15, 1992, at a meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, most CIS members signed the Collective Security
Treaty (CST), which obliged the signatories to assist
each other against external aggression. Of the CIS
members, only Moldova and Turkmenistan did not
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join the CST. Although Russia saw the CST as an instrument to promote Moscow’s power and influence in the
former Soviet Union, the other signatories welcomed
Russian pledges to respect their national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and control of the military assets
that they inherited from the Soviet era.1 These governments also sought to sustain access to Russia’s arms
and military technologies since they still relied heavily on Soviet-era weaponry. These defense industries
had all suffered from the abrupt collapse of the Soviet
military-industrial complex, which has been based on
integrated supply chains, research and development,
production, and maintenance elements.2 The Protocol
of Prolongation, valid initially for 5 years after it came
into force, was extended for automatic renewal every 5
years in April 1999. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan declined the new arrangement and tried to deepen
their ties with Western institutions. Ukraine ended its
association with the CIS in May 2018.
In 2002, some CST members signed a charter creating a new regional military structure: the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (Organizacija Dogovora o
Kollektivnoj Bezopasnosti, abbreviated as ODKB in Russian). While maintaining the existing formal security
pledges by member states under the CST, the new
organization aimed to foster deeper and more concrete cooperation. Members sought to transform the
mutual security commitments under the CST into a
more institutionalized form of cooperation involving standing structures, periodic exercises, and other
attributes of a strong regional security institution,
such as NATO. Even so, for several years, the CSTO
existed mostly as a paper structure, providing a multinational shell for potential cooperation among members’ national defense forces. However, over the past
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decade, the CSTO has strengthened its authority and
capabilities as well as fostered increased joint weapons
manufacturing; integrated air defenses; multinational
military training; and collective peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics activities among its
members.3
Moscow has strived to bolster the CSTO’s international legitimacy. The initial focus was on securing NATO’s recognition of the CSTO as an equal and
equivalent partner. Until Russian-NATO relations
collapsed following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea
in March 2014, Russian and CSTO officials repeatedly
proposed joint actions with NATO to fight terrorism,
counter narcotics trafficking, and support Afghanistan’s security.4 NATO has consistently rejected these
initiatives, seeing the CSTO as a Russian-led organization that supports Moscow’s drive to strengthen its
influence in the former Soviet Union.5 Though shunned
by the West, the CSTO has gained some international
recognition elsewhere. In 2004, the United Nations
(UN) General Assembly adopted a resolution granting the CSTO formal observer status. The organization established contacts with the Counter-Terrorism
Committee of the UN Security Council. In March 2010,
the CSTO signed an agreement with the UN Secretariat that allowed for the organization to support UNmandated peacekeeping missions.6 In 2012, the CSTO
and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
signed a memorandum on cooperation to prevent
and resolve conflicts.7 The CSTO’s contacts with the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) include meetings between senior officials of
both organizations and reciprocal invitations to major
events.8 The CSTO has also built connections with the
Anti-Terrorism Center and other security organs of the
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CIS, an organization that includes former Soviet republics that are not CSTO members (notably Uzbekistan).
Finally, Moscow has promoted ties between the CSTO
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a
more comprehensive regional organization that promotes economic and security cooperation among its
full members (which includes all CSTO members plus
China, Uzbekistan, and more recently India and Pakistan). In 2007, the CSTO and SCO Secretariats signed
a memorandum of understanding that defines their
relationship and expresses the readiness of both organizations to cooperate on crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and other regional security issues on an “equal
and constructive” basis.9
STRUCTURE
Since its formal inauguration in October 2003,
when all its member states ratified the organization’s
founding documents, the CSTO has developed a more
defined legal basis, including a charter that defines the
main legal bodies and officers as follows:
• The Collective Security Council, comprised
of the heads of the member states, determines
the CSTO’s fundamental goals and makes decisions to achieve them. It can also create working
groups and other temporary bodies; the chair
rotates each year before the annual presidential
summit.
• The Permanent Council coordinates the CSTO
activities between Collective Security Council
sessions.
• The Foreign Ministers Council promotes international cooperation among members.
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• The Defense Ministers Council coordinates
members’ defense policies.
• The Military Industrial Commission promotes cooperation among members’ defense
industries.
• The Committee of Security Council Secretaries
harmonizes members’ internal security and law
enforcement policies.
• The Secretary General is the CSTO’s chief administrative officer and represents the organization
to other bodies.
• The Secretariat provides administrative, technical, and other support for CSTO activities.
• The Military Committee, supported by the CSTO
Joint Staff, prepares and implements militaryrelated plans and activities.
• The CSTO Parliamentary Assembly Council promotes cooperation among members’ legislative
bodies and helps harmonize national legislation.
The CSTO also has lower-level interagency bodies,
such as the Coordinating Council of Heads of Competent Bodies for Countering Drug Trafficking. The presidential summits and other major meetings adopt joint
statements, resolutions, and protocols that summarize
the collective concerns of the CSTO governments as
well as their future goals. During meetings, the CSTO
leaders typically issue joint statements on various
international security issues, such as missile defense,
Iran, and Syria. In doing so, they aim to amplify the
impact of their individual views by speaking with a
collective voice. The member governments also regularly present collectively agreed upon documents to
multinational originations such as the UN; they proposed more than a dozen such documents in 2017.10
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These joint declarations usually support Moscow’s
position but can also back other members’ policies.
For example, at Armenia’s initiative, in April 2014, the
CSTO issued a collective statement condemning the
occupation of the Syrian town of Kessab, populated
by ethnic Armenians, by an al-Qaeda linked extremist
group.11
MISSIONS
The CSTO’s original military purpose was to
counter external aggression against its members and
align their foreign policy stances around common
positions. In recent years, the CSTO governments have
tasked the organization with pursuing a wider range
of objectives and have provided further resources and
authorities to achieve them. For example, the CSTO has
devoted greater attention to countering modern transnational threats, such as terrorism, drug trafficking,
illegal migration, organized crime, weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) proliferation, and cyber menaces.
In the words of Belarus’s Foreign Ministry:
[T]he CSTO has transformed from a ‘classic’ militarypolitical bloc, focused on protecting allies from foreign
aggression, into a multifunctional regional organization
that can provide a comprehensive security of Member
States.12

The Central Asian members are especially vulnerable to these threats given their proximity to the volatile regions of South Asia and the Middle East. For
instance, they are situated along the paths that traffickers use to convey narcotics to Russia and Europe along
the “northern route” from Afghanistan, the world’s
largest producer of opium. Regional terrorist groups
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traffic drugs and people to buy weapons and bribe
border guards. Terrorist infiltration is a constant concern for the CSTO member states because Tajikistan
shares an approximately 1,300 kilometer (km)-long
border with Afghanistan. Through Operation NELEGAL, the CSTO member states collaborate against
illegal migration, beyond monitoring the movement
of potential terrorists.13 The member governments
are reviewing a draft multi-year action plan on countering illicit migration.14 For years, many CSTO leaders blamed NATO for failing to suppress the Afghan
drug trade and insurgency. More recently, they have
expressed anxiety about NATO’s possible premature
withdrawal from the Afghan war, which they fear
could create a security vacuum that could destabilize
much of Eurasia.
In addition to the Afghan Taliban, the CSTO
member governments have identified several other
threatening Islamist groups active in the former Soviet
republics: the Islamic Resistance Party of Tajikistan,
the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU), and more recently al-Qaeda and
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, also known
as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant, the Islamic State, and by the
Arabic language acronym, Daesh). During the 1990s,
the IMU emerged as the main terrorist movement in
Central Asia. The IMU formally came into being in
1998, but its precursor organizations had been active
in Central Asia since the collapse of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. In their August 1999
communiqué, IMU leaders proclaimed their objective
of overthrowing the secular regime of Uzbek President Islam Karimov and establishing a Taliban-style
Islamic republic. The organization detonated bombs
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in Uzbekistan, attempted to assassinate Karimov, and
invaded southern Kyrgyzstan, where IMU fighters
seized foreigners as hostages and ransomed them for
money. IMU guerrillas sought but failed to establish
a base of operations in the Fergana Valley in order
to gather recruits and wage a protracted insurgency
against the Uzbek Government. The IMU developed
extensive connections with al-Qaeda as well as with
the Taliban when they ruled Afghanistan. Following
the large-scale U.S. military intervention there in October 2001, the IMU lost its bases in Afghanistan and had
to relocate to Pakistan and other territories. Kyrgyz
authorities feared that IMU operatives had established
sleeper cells within their territory, especially in the
Fergana Valley, by blending in with the local population. In April 2003, Uzbekistani authorities discovered
a possible IMU bomb plot when construction workers
found a probable improvised explosive device in the
basement of a Tashkent hotel. Some of the IMU’s operatives may have been involved in the bombings that
occurred in Uzbekistan from March to April 2004 and
in Tajikistan in 2006.15
Another terrorist group of great concern to the
CSTO members is al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This
group has historically not focused on Central Asia
because its leader, Osama bin Laden, was preoccupied with other regions. Additionally, because of the
presence of other jihadist organizations in the region,
al-Qaeda saw little need for taking on the burden of
starting an insurgency there. Nevertheless, the group
has been involved in providing some training, leadership, and logistical support to Central Asian militants
that have joined its ranks in Afghanistan and Pakistan.16 Al-Qaeda and the more narrowly focused Central Asian terrorist groups obtain multiple mutual or
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reciprocal benefits from their partnerships. For instance,
the IMU received the right to operate in Afghanistan;
in exchange, it helped the Taliban and al-Qaeda fight
their respective opponents.17 Although al-Qaeda is
predominantly an Arab organization, by collaborating
with foreign Muslim terrorist networks, the group can
extend its reach to non-Arab Muslim countries within
the framework of a global jihad. The CSTO governments have more recently focused on the ISIS threat.
As early as 2015, then Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov claimed, “[T]hey are starting to
push toward the southern borders of our allies, first of
all those in the CSTO.”18 At the September 2015 CSTO
summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for
forming an international coalition against ISIS, arguing, “the global community must unite in the face of
these threats.”19
Yet, the Russian military intervention in Syria has
promoted radicalization and encouraged retaliatory
strikes against Moscow and its allies. The Syrian civil
war has helped extremists recruit, train, and empower
scores of Muslim militants, including some from
Russia and Central Asia. Averting or reversing radicalization remains the responsibility of its member
governments, some of whom have been criticized for
excessively curbing religious liberty. The CSTO analysts fear that these fighters, along with homegrown
radicals, will wage jihad in Central Asian countries,
which have secular governments despite their large
Muslim populations.20 In 2015, Sergei Smirnov, the
First Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Security
Service (FSB) remarked that 2,400 Russian citizens are
now fighting for ISIS, along with about 3,000 Central
Asians.”21 Almazbek Atambayev, the then-President
of Kyrgyzstan, added:
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[I]t is of particular concern that there have been numerous
cases of recruitment of our citizens to participate in
armed conflict . . . and of them subsequently returning to
continue their terrorist activities and recruitment in the
countries of this region.22

Furthermore, Kazakhstani President Nursultan
Nazarbayev acknowledged, “that citizens of the CSTO
member states join radical groups and participate in
illegal activities in the Middle East and Afghanistan . . .
[which] requires effective measures from our side.”23
In June 2018, the CSTO foreign ministers warned that
ISIS was “creating a bridgehead in northern Afghanistan, that is, in direct proximity to the CSTO zone of
responsibility.”24
Information security has become a growing CSTO
security priority. The member governments, which
exercise various forms of domestic media censorship,
have expressed concern about how terrorists, Western
governments, and their domestic opponents can exploit
the Internet to recruit followers and organize subversive activities. Following Moscow’s lead, the CSTO
governments have sought to use the organization to
strengthen their control over information. For example, through Operation PROXY, launched in October
2012, members’ intelligence organizations have collaborated to strengthen their security against terrorist
extremists, criminals, political provocateurs, and other
potential cyber threats. These governments have also,
through the CSTO and other means, blocked their citizens from accessing thousands of websites suspected
of publicizing extremist views.25 In December 2014, the
Collective Security Council adopted a resolution on
coordinating the CSTO responses to cyber incidents
and a protocol on resisting “criminal activities in the
information sphere.”26 The Russian Government has
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proposed UN resolutions calling for collective actions
against “information terrorism,” which would include
any information that could “distort the perception of
the political system, social order, domestic and foreign policy, important political and social processes
in the state [or] spiritual, moral, and cultural values of
its citizens.”27 In 2017, Jenish Razakov, Kyrgyzstan’s
Deputy Prime Minister for national security and law
enforcement, called on the CSTO to spearhead a collective approach to cybersecurity and information assurance for the region.28 The CSTO sponsors the Center
for Modern Technology at Moscow University, which
trains information security specialists.
The actual degree of danger presented by Islamist
terrorist groups to the CSTO members is unknown.
While all these countries have seen radicalization and
Islamist-linked violence, but their governments have
an incentive to exaggerate this threat to justify domestic security measures that they might like to take for
other reasons. In addition, Moscow can use terrorist
threats to justify Russian military actions and secure
cooperation from other CSTO members.29 Other
CSTO members initially opposed Russia’s aspiration
to expand the organization’s combat capabilities and
missions. The leaders of these newly independent
states were reluctant to compromise their post-Soviet
autonomy. However, the Russia-Georgia War of 2008,
the mass violence in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the “social
revolutions” in the Arab states during the last few
years, and NATO’s inability to suppress the Taliban
insurgency in Afghanistan had sufficiently alarmed
the CSTO members to outweigh concerns about augmenting the organization’s missions and capabilities.
In a way, the war in Syria may have drawn potential
militants out of Eurasia.30
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CAPABILITIES
The CSTO has several types of collective military
forces made up of units from the armed forces of the
member states, including large combined regional
forces available upon national mobilization, standing
rapid reaction forces, and smaller special purpose forces
for peacekeeping, drug interdiction, and other lowintensity missions. The CSTO was originally designed
to mobilize multinational coalitions in wartime under
a joint command. On paper, three such multinational
frameworks exist, though they do not regularly conduct exercises: an East European group with Russia
and Belarus, a Caucasian group involving Russia and
Armenia, and a Southern group that includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. In addition to
these three original regional collective-defense groups,
the CSTO has developed rapid reaction forces consisting mostly of elite military units to engage in counterterrorism and peacekeeping missions and potentially
prevent social revolutions in member countries. In
theory, the CSTO members fall under the protection of
Moscow’s nuclear umbrella, though the precise extent
of any Russian extended deterrent guarantee remains
unclear.31
In 2009, the CSTO officially created a Kollektivniye
Sily Operativnogo Reagirovaniya (Collective Rapid Reaction Force [CRRF], KSOR in Russian).32 The CRRF is
designed to conduct low-intensity operations, which
include peacekeeping, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, emergency response, and countering narcotics
trafficking and other transnational criminal activity.33
Unlike the CSTO’s three large multinational groups,
the CRRF engages in regular exercises, especially in
Central Asia, where the main transnational threats are
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concentrated. It includes special purpose forces as well
as conventional combat troops.34 Originally, the CRRF
planned to have approximately 16,000 troops, with the
Russian military comprising approximately half of that
total.35 However, the CSTO later increased the size of
the CRRF to more than 25,000 troops. The force is split
into a large battle group of 22,000 and a 3,500-member
Central Asian Regional Rapid Collective Deployment
Force (KSBR TsAR), which maintains a higher state of
combat readiness and is intended for use only in Central Asia.36 If deployed, the CRRF and the KSBR TsAR
would fall under multinational command. Yet, neither
the CRRF nor the KSBR TsAR has been deployed in an
actual operation.
Each CSTO member contributes to the CRRF, but
Russia and Kazakhstan make much larger troop commitments than the other members. Russia has assigned
the 98th Guards Airborne Division, the 31st Guards
Air Assault Brigade, and the 15th Guards Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade to the CRRF. In addition to
these combat units, Russia has pledged several paramilitary and special police units from non-Ministry of
Defense (MOD) agencies, including detachments of
the FSB Border Department, to the CRRF to address
terrorism and narcotics trafficking. The new Russian
National Guard, created in 2016, could further assist
with these non-combat missions. It has several hundred thousand personnel as well as light armored
vehicles, mortars, and small arms and light weaponry.37 The CRRF also includes Armenia’s 23d Independent Special Operations Brigade, Belarus’s 103d
Independent Guards Mobile Brigade, Kazakhstan’s 1st
Independent Marines Brigade, Kyrgyzstan’s 2d Guard
Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, and Tajikistan’s
7th Independent Airborne Assault Brigade, as well as
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some other specialized units, such as “Grom” (Thunder), the special purpose detachment for fighting narcotics trafficking.38
The CSTO has additionally discussed creating a
collective crisis reaction center, which would coordinate closely with Russia’s MOD.39 The organization
still operates a database of regional terrorist members
and groups.40 Moreover, Russia maintains large military bases in other CSTO member countries, for which
it pays little or no rent. The Russian 201st Motorized
Rifle Division has been in Tajikistan since 1989 and,
according to existing agreements, will be maintained
until at least 2042. Planes based at the Russian airbase
in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, can patrol all of Central Asia as
well as Afghanistan without refueling. Russia also has
a major military base in Armenia.
As an incentive for CSTO membership and as a
means of keeping its allies dependent on its military,
the Russian Government provides the CSTO personnel
with subsidized education and training opportunities
at Russian military institutions. Moscow also allows
the CSTO allies to purchase Russian weapons at the
same cost as its own armed forces. These transfers
occur directly between Russia and its allies instead of
through the CSTO. The organization facilitates cooperation among members’ defense industries, which were
tightly connected during the USSR as part of the integrated Soviet military-industrial complex.41 In 2016,
the CSTO members agreed to create a common service
center support network for their military equipment.42
In 2017, Russia announced plans to arm some CRRF
elements almost free of charge, but the implementation
date for this arrangement has been postponed from
2015 to 2016 to at least the 2018 to 2019 period.43 Of the
five Central Asian states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
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depend the most on Russia for security due to deficiencies in equipment and training, while Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan have stronger national defense forces, and
Turkmenistan has limited its defense ties with Russia.
While the balance of forces between Armenia and
Azerbaijan is unclear, Armenia needs Moscow’s assistance to counter a possible Turkish military intervention on Azerbaijan’s behalf. Belarus could not defend
itself in an improbable war with NATO without strong
Russian military support.
Proposals to create a joint CSTO collective air force
and a collective air and missile defense system have
made only partial progress.44 However, the Joint CIS
Air Defense System, established in 2005, covers most
of the CSTO region. For example, the Russian Air Force
patrols Tajikistan’s airspace as part of the CIS system.45
Furthermore, Russia has been expanding bilateral air
defense cooperation directly with some CSTO members such as Belarus and Kazakhstan that, unlike Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, have modern air forces and air
defense systems.46 These arrangements are not under
the CSTO command but do provide protection for the
organization’s zone of responsibility, especially given
Russia’s strong national air defenses.47 Even a modest
regional air defense network could help protect the
CSTO members against terrorist drone attacks of the
kinds seen in Syria.48 Russia has undertaken talks with
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to establish similar bilateral
air defense networks, though neither Tajikistan nor
Kyrgyzstan has combat fighter aviation or modern Russian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.49 However,
proposing a unified air defense system allows Moscow
to offer collective military support without deploying
more troops to the region.50 In any case, whatever the
arrangement, these countries will remain dependent
on the Russian Air Force and its SAM systems.
16

EXERCISES
Each year, the CSTO Secretariat and Joint Staff
adopt and execute an annual Command and Forces
Collective Combat Training Plan. The CSTO has been
increasing the frequency of its major exercises in recent
years, especially since the Ukraine conflict began in
2014. These drills have numbered about half-a-dozen
annually in recent years and aim to improve the organization’s capabilities for collective defense, counternarcotics, counterinsurgency, reconnaissance, and
rapid response. The “Vzainmodeystviye” (translated
in English as “interaction,” sometimes “cooperation”
or “collaboration”) drills are the annual large-scale
multinational exercises for testing the CRRF’s conventional capabilities. The “Rubezh” (“Frontier”)
series tests the rapid deployment of collective forces
against hypothetical terrorist organizations based in
Afghanistan or Central Asia. The “Nerushimoe bratstvo” (“Unbreakable Brotherhood,” also translated as
“Enduring Brotherhood” or “Indestructible Brotherhood”) drills which began in 2012, focus on rehearsing various peacekeeping skills. The periodic “Kobalt”
(also “Cobalt”) exercises train the members’ interior
troops, counternarcotics units, emergency response,
and other internal security forces. The similar “Grom”
drills rehearse joint counternarcotics operations by
members’ national drug and law enforcement bodies.
The “Poisk” (“Search”) drills rehearse reconnaissance
of terrorists and other infiltrators using the CSTO air,
ground, and special forces.51
The CSTO held three major joint exercises in 2014.
In early July, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and
Tajikistan conducted conventional military drills in
“Rubezh-2014” to improve joint command of rapid
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response multinational forces. From July 29 to August
1, 2014, all the CSTO members contributed some 700
personnel supported by BTR-70 armored personnel
carriers (APC), BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV),
and Mi-17 transport helicopters, in the three-phased
“Unbreakable Brotherhood-2014” peacekeeping drills
at Kyrgyzstan’s Ala-Too firing range.52 The following
month, Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan engaged in “Interaction-2014”
at the military range at Spassk in Kazakhstan’s Karaganda region. Between August 18 and August 22, 2014,
approximately 3,000 service members (including 500
Russian airborne troops), 200 military systems, and
some 30 jets and helicopters simulated various defense
missions, including cybersecurity, psychological warfare, and air transport of CRRF elements protected by
the Russian-Kazakhstani joint air defense network.53
The exercise scenario posited two hypothetical countries, with:
an imaginary state Karania making part of the CSTO,
and an imaginary state Irtyshia that borders on Karania
and suffers from a deep domestic policy crisis triggered
by a separatist movement on the back of exacerbated
interethnic clashes.54

Karania then appeals to the CSTO for military
assistance.
The “Interaction-2015” drills occurred from August
23 to August 28 and were staged at the Russian airborne forces’ training range in Pskov, about 40 km from
Estonia’s border. All 6 member states participated in
some capacity, providing some 2,000 troops (regular
soldiers but also emergency, interior, and drug control personnel); 200 pieces of military hardware; and
40 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, including Su-27
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fighters, Su-24 tactical bombers, Il-76 transport aircraft,
and Mil MI-24, MI-26, and Kamov KA-52 helicopters.
Russia’s Western Military District (MD) commanded
the exercises and deployed two paratroop battalions
(about 1,000 troops). Tajikistan sent one assault platoon, Kyrgyzstan deployed one platoon, while Kazakhstan sent a nuclear, chemical, and biological defense
unit. Only Belarusian and Kazakhstani forces brought
their own equipment; Russia had to provide the
Armenian, Kyrgyz, and Tajikistani contingents with
weaponry. The exercise tested the CRRF’s commandand-control arrangements for planning and executing collective intervention against local terrorists subverting a member government (e.g., similar to that of
Belarus), as well as for interdicting narcotics trafficking,
conducting airborne operations, responding to emergencies, and upholding members’ territorial integrity.55 Some analysts speculated that Interaction-2015
represented a response to the recent NATO drills in
Estonia; however, the CSTO Deputy Secretary General
Valeriy Semerikov said he:
would not like our exercise to be seen as a counter to the
exercise NATO is now holding in the West. Our exercise
is a planned one and was given the go-ahead last year
by the ministers of defense and the Security Council
secretaries.56

Russia conducted the “Center-2015” (or “Tsentr2015”) national strategic exercise from September
14-20, 2015. The Russian MOD described the drills as
a command and staff exercise that focused on training the Russian armed forces as well as joint combat
training activities of the CSTO. The exercise included
approximately 95,000 personnel and more than 7,000
pieces of hardware as well as 170 aircraft and 20 ships.
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It took place at several locations in Russia’s Central MD,
Russia’s largest, as well as off Kazakhstan’s Caspian
Sea coast. The exercise covered a multitude of security
and defense-related drills, including a counterterrorist
operation in the CSTO’s Central Asian region. Military
attachés from dozens of countries, along with President Putin, watched the last stage of the exercise in
Orenburg.57
“Unbreakable Brotherhood-2015,” which occurred
in late September through early October 2015, trained
the CSTO peacekeeping forces in Armenia. The exercise included armed forces, police units, and representatives from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. It also included
representatives from the International Committee of
the Red Cross, the CSTO Joint Headquarters, and the
CSTO Secretariat. Unbreakable Brotherhood-2015 consisted of three stages that lasted 5 days and involved
600 troops, 50 pieces of army hardware, helicopters,
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Particular attention was paid to improving the coordination of peacekeeping troops, liquidating terrorists, dealing with the
mass media, rendering first aid in cooperation with the
International Red Cross, and responding to a chemical
emergency.58
From April 18-22, 2016, the CSTO conducted its
first large-scale military reconnaissance exercise,
“Poisk 2016” (“Search-2016”), at the Lohour and
Maghob training grounds in Tajikistan, where a simulated militant attack occurred. Although all the
CSTO members contributed some of the 1,500 service personnel, the drills focused on rehearsing the
application of advanced Russian military technology
and tactics for collecting, analyzing, and distributing
tactical-operational battlefield intelligence against
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armed adversaries; strategic-operational mobility for
rapid response; advanced networked information
technology; and other combat support capabilities. For
example, helicopter crews dropped paratroopers close
to enemy formations to cut off their lines of communication, while the participants also used electronic
reconnaissance equipment to target “enemy” communications points.59 At the end of the year, “Clear Sky
2016,” an international command and staff exercise
conducted by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia,
aimed to enhance interoperability between the CSTO
military staffs.60
All the CSTO members participated in the multiphased fall “Combat Brotherhood 2017,” which
occurred throughout the southern region of the CSTO
and, for the first time, was based on a single integrating political-military concept and scenario. Under Colonel General Alexander Dvornikov, Commander of
the Russian Southern MD, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan contributed
both regular and specialized units for the CRRF drills,
which totaled 12,000 troops, 1,500 major pieces of
hardware, some 90 aircraft, and other combat equipment. The Russian contingents included: regular
forces; National Guard units; and Ministry of Russian
Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies, and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM) emergency response troops. The first phase,
“Search-2017,” which took place from October 3-7,
2017, drilled members’ reconnaissance forces. In the
second phase, “Interaction-2017,” which took place
from October 9-13, 2017, Russian and Armenian regular units exercised at Armenia’s Bagramyan and
the Alagyaz training grounds. The third stage, the
“Unbreakable Brotherhood-2017” peacekeeping drills,
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took place from October 16-20, 2017, at two ranges in
Kazakhstan. The CSTO Collective Peacekeeping Forces
rehearsed conducting negotiations, escorting humanitarian deliveries, operating checkpoints, psychological
and information operations, and eliminating terrorists.61 In the final phase of Combat Brotherhood 2017,
which occurred from November 10-20, 2017, more than
5,000 troops, 300 major ground platforms, and some 60
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft of the CRRF rehearsed
counterterrorist missions in the mountainous areas of
Tajikistan. The multiple forces, locations, and phases of
the Combat Brotherhood 2017 exercise simulated the
various missions that might occur under unified command and control when defending the southern CSTO
region from state and especially non-state actors.62
In June 2018, the CSTO members held “Kobalt2018” in Kazakhstan. The drill included more than
700 special forces units, 70 pieces of combat and specialized equipment, six aviation systems, and artillery
weapons. The special forces used UAVs to provide
intelligence for the CRRF, including troops from Russia’s Internal Affairs Ministry and National Guard,
Kazakhstan’s National Guard, and internal security
units from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus. The 3
days of drills simulated a range of scenarios, including
detection and elimination of an illegal armed group
of terrorists.63 In the fall of 2018, Kyrgyzstan will host
“Interaction-2018.” Participating in this drill will be an
estimated 3,000 personnel, 600 pieces of military hardware, and some 40 aircraft.64 The drill will rehearse
peacemaking, rapid response, interoperability, reconnaissance, and air force missions.65 It will reportedly
feature a new operational format allowing for more
synchronized exercise management across the CSTO
members. In October, the CSTO peacekeeping exercise
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“Indestructible Brotherhood-2018” will occur in Russia.66 Starting that month, the month-long Combat
Brotherhood 2018 drills will practice redeploying the
CSTO contingents by air.67 Russian Defense Minister
Sergei Shoigu explained that these exercises are part
of an integrated series of CSTO drills “conducted in
October this year in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
and Tajikistan sequentially under a single plan.”68
Depending on their location, the large annual Russian national military drills, which rotate among Russia’s four major geographic commands, can include
a CSTO multinational component. Russia’s Western
(“Zapad”) MD strategic military exercise encompasses
Belarus, while the quadrennial drill in Russia’s Central MD (“Center” or “Tsentr”) covers Armenia and
the Central Asian CSTO members. The Zapad 2017
exercise featured an estimated 60,000 to 70,000 Russian
troops, including premier units such as Russia’s 1st
Guards Tank Army, 11th Army Corps, 3 airborne divisions and the Baltic Fleet, as well as hundreds of pieces
of military equipment, such as S-400 air defense interceptors and SS-26 Iskander missile units.69 The Tsentr
exercises in 2008, 2011, and 2015, occurred primarily in
Russia but did have some drills in Central Asia.
MEMBERS AND THEIR MOTIVES
During the past 2 decades, the CSTO’s membership—currently consisting of Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia—has
been very stable. On two occasions, Uzbekistan was a
formal CSTO member for a few years, but was not very
active during either period. Apart from that exception,
all the countries that signed the CSTO Charter in 2002
have remained in the alliance, while no new states have
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become permanent members. Article 19 of the Charter
holds that membership is open to any state that shares
its purposes and principles and is prepared to undertake the Charter’s obligations. Article 19 also allows
any member state to withdraw from the organization,
as Uzbekistan did most recently in 2012. Belarus President Alexandr Lukashenko has said that future EEU
members must also join the CSTO, but this is not an
official policy.70 Unlike in the case of the EEU, Moscow
has not pressed hard for further CSTO membership
enlargement.
The official justification for the creation of the CSTO,
as stated in Article 3 of the Charter, was to promote
“international and regional security and stability, and
to ensure the collective defense of the independence,
territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the member
States.” Specifically, the CSTO is designed to preserve
“security on [a] collective basis.” Article 2 states:
In case [of] a threat to security, territorial integrity, and
sovereignty of one or several Member States, or a threat
to international peace and security, Member States will
immediately put into action the mechanism of joined
consultations with the aim to coordinate their positions
and take measures to eliminate the threat that has
emerged.71

This tenet is reinforced in Article 4, which affirms the
responsibilities of member states:
In case an act of aggression is committed against any
of the Member States, all the other Member States will
provide it with necessary assistance, including military
[assistance], as well as provide support with the means at
their disposal in exercise of the right to collective defense
in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.72
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While Armenia and Belarus provide the CSTO with
security requirements and armed forces in Eastern
Europe and the Caucasus, respectively, the organization’s primary regional focus has been Central Asia.
There, the CSTO has bolstered Moscow’s influence
by helping justify Russia’s bases in the region, offering incentives for Central Asian militaries to cooperate with Moscow, and providing legal justification for
potential Russian military interventions. The other
Central Asian member governments, excluded from
NATO or any other powerful defense alliance, perceived security benefits in participating in the CSTO.
The general goals of combating terrorism, countering drug trafficking, and pledging assistance to each
other in the case of aggression are widely appealing.
However, each government also pursues unique objectives through membership. For example, the Belarus
regime worries about many threats, including Russia,
NATO, state, and non-state actors, while Armenians
see the CSTO primarily as a means to secure Russian
support against rival nation-state Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, the Central Asian governments of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan worry most about terrorist
threats. All the non-Russian CSTO members perceive
the organization as an instrument to obtain some Russian weaponry and other Russian defense industrial
assistance, albeit with some compromises regarding
their sovereignty.73
Russian Federation
Russia is clearly the dominant CSTO member and
has been the driving force behind the organization’s
development. The size of Russia’s population, economy, defense budget, and armed forces dwarf those
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of the other members. The Russian armed forces’ ability to conduct large-scale operations and project military power beyond its borders surpasses that of any
other CSTO member. Its recent Zapad 2017 strategic
exercise featured tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of pieces of military equipment. Russia is also
the only CSTO member with foreign military bases,
having major facilities in Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In April 2018, Shoigu announced
that Russia would reinforce its Kant Air Base, along
with its military facility in Tajikistan in part to address
the threat of ISIS militants in Afghanistan.74 Russian
defense firms are also the primary arms suppliers of
the CSTO armed forces. Furthermore, Moscow uses its
influence in other international organizations, such as
the UN and the SCO, to promote the CSTO.75
The balance of influence within the CSTO clearly
reflects these power imbalances. The CSTO Secretariat is based in Moscow, and most of the organization’s
employees are Russian citizens. For most of its history,
the organization’s Secretary General was former Russian General Nikolai Bordyuzha.76 Moscow also uses
military exercises to promote its interests within the
CSTO. During the Zapad 2017 drills, Russia pressured
Belarus to maintain cooperation with Moscow.77 Russia
also employed Combat Brotherhood 2017 to improve
relations with Kazakhstan, after tensions rose between
the two states over Astana’s refusal to deploy troops to
Syria in support of the Assad regime.78 Even the practice of allowing other CSTO members to purchase Russian weapons at subsidized prices benefits Moscow’s
interests. For example, the sales can strengthen Russia’s forward defenses by providing advanced weaponry to allies that could not otherwise afford them.79
Russia’s modernization of the Tajik military helps to
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keep Afghan militants from reaching Russian borders.80 Subsidizing sales of Russian S-300 and S-400
SAM systems to Belarus strengthens Russia’s western
forward defenses.81 Belarus could not have afforded
the purchase without the discounts.82 These weapons
transfers can also preempt Western and Chinese sales
to CSTO members and thereby sustain Moscow’s predominant military influence in these countries. For
instance, by selling fighter jets to Kazakhstan, Moscow
can limit opportunities for Western defense engagement with that country.83
Moscow seeks to pursue a variety of goals through
the CSTO. Its priorities involve augmenting Russian
military power projection capabilities, legitimizing
Moscow’s foreign activities, constraining other members’ policies, and limiting Western military activities
in the former Soviet space.84 The CSTO augments Russia’s international influence by allowing Moscow to
claim it is acting as the head of an alliance of states or
in defense of their interests. The other CSTO governments have supported Russia on important issues, such
as Moscow’s military intervention in Syria and its criticism of NATO. The organization also helps legitimize
Russia’s military presence in other member countries.
For example, Moscow justifies its military facilities in
Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan as contributing
to the CSTO multinational missions.85 (The CSTO as
an institution does not have military bases; they all
belong to the member governments.) The CSTO Charter requires Russian authorization before a member
can host a non-member’s troops, circumscribing the
Western military presence in these countries.
Though Russia is by far the most powerful member,
the CSTO is a weak organization, which has encouraged Moscow to apply other bilateral and multilateral
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security tools. The other member governments also
showed reluctance to back Moscow’s most controversial actions, including the Russia-Georgia War of
2008, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, and
Moscow’s increased tensions with Turkey.86 Most
recently, after Turkey shot down a Russian Sukhoi
Su-24, Moscow only received rhetorical support from
the CSTO member states, which aimed to balance
their obligations to the alliance with their respective
relationships with Turkey.87 As an alternative tool,
Moscow will exploit unresolved (“frozen”) territorial
conflicts among the former Soviet republics. Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have such
conflicts, which provide Russia with the opportunity
to exert influence over warring factions and play a key
role in peace negotiations.88 For example, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict gives Russia, which sells weapons to both states, substantial leverage.
Republic of Armenia
Landlocked between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran,
and Turkey, Armenia is the only CSTO member
located wholly in the South Caucasus region of Eurasia. Its conflict with Azerbaijan remains its immediate national security policy priority, with bilateral
tensions centering on the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
From 1988 to 1994, some 30,000 Azeris and Armenians died fighting to control the enclave. Since then,
an oft-violated ceasefire has prevailed, though fighting flared anew during a 4-day conflict in April 2016.
As the only CSTO member facing a plausible military
attack from another country, Armenia has accordingly
been very supportive of the organization. Armenia is a
founding member of the organization and has backed
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all its major initiatives. For instance, in 2009, Armenia
assigned a unit to the newly created CRRF. Since then,
Armenia has been an active participant in almost all
major CRRF exercises and has hosted several of them.
Armenia held the rotating chair of the CSTO from 2007
to 2008 and from 2015 to 2016. During its latter chairmanship, Armenia focused on harmonizing members’
foreign policies, improving management of the CSTO,
conducting more exercises, developing the organization’s legal foundation, enhancing its logistical
infrastructure, collaborating with other international
institutions such as the UN and the SCO, promoting
defense industrial cooperation, combating international terrorism, and finalizing “The CSTO Collective
Security Strategy for the Period till 2025.”89 Armenian
General Yuri Khatchaturov became the CSTO Secretary
General in May 2017. Defense Minister Vigen Sargsyan
considered it a “huge privilege” that the CSTO members could buy weapons from each other at discounted
prices as well as use each other’s professional military
education institutions.90
Yerevan has long relied on Moscow’s patronage
and protection against regional adversaries. Such ties
continued after Armenia became newly independent
from the Soviet Union. Armenia relies on bilateral
as well as multilateral support from Moscow for its
conventional defenses perhaps more than any other
CSTO member. From Moscow’s perspective, having
Armenia as an ally helps Russia maintain a forward
military presence in the South Caucasus. Thousands of
Russian troops have since remained in Armenia, while
the two countries have negotiated dozens of bilateral defense agreements covering military bases, joint
defense structures, and other security collaboration.
Armenian-Russian economic ties reinforce this defense
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connection. Russia accounts for about a quarter of
Armenia’s foreign trade and approximately one-third
of Armenia’s incoming foreign investment.91 Russian
corporations and oligarchs have a strong presence in
Armenia’s energy, mining, transportation, financial,
media, and telecommunications sectors. ArmRosGazProm, Russian railways, telecom operators MTS and
Beeline, as well as leading Russian financial institutions have been the key investors in Armenia. Russia
partly finances Armenian border security and helps
patrol the Armenian-Turkish border.92 In June 2016,
Russia and Armenia established a joint air defense
system, which allows Armenia to benefit from Russia’s
superior capabilities.93 In July 2017, they created joint
Russian-Armenian military units. During peacetime,
Armenia’s general staff has command of the units;
during wartime, depending on the threat conditions
and by mutual agreement, they could be subordinated
to Russia’s Southern MD.94 The Armenian Defense
Ministry has even expressed a willingness to consider
sending professional (non-conscripted) soldiers to
Syria to aid local demining efforts.95
In 2010, Yerevan and Moscow agreed to extend
Russia’s military presence in Armenia until 2044.
Russia maintains two major military bases in Armenia:
the 102d Military Base of the Group of Russian Forces
in Transcaucasia located in Gyumri; and the 3624th
Air Base located at Erebuni Airport south of Yerevan.
The base in Gyumri, Armenia’s second largest city
situated near the Turkish border, houses some 5,000
Russian troops consisting of three mechanized infantry units, and one artillery unit. Their pieces of heavy
weaponry include T-72 tanks, BMP-2 and BTR 70/80
armored vehicles, BM-21 and BM-30 multiple rocket
launchers, as well as a battalion of S-300V and BukM1
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air defense systems. At Erebuni, Russia has deployed
MiG-29 fighter jets and Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters.96
Furthermore, Russia has been Armenia’s main arms
supplier since independence. As part of the basing
extension agreement, Russia supplied Armenia with
almost US$800 million in new weaponry, including
Navodchick-2 and Takhion UAVs, and Mi-24 helicopter gunships. In July 2015, Moscow approved a
US$200-million loan for Armenia to purchase Russian
military equipment, at below-market Russian domestic prices, including Smerch multiple-launch rocket
systems, TOS-1A heavy flamethrowers, anti-tank
weapons, and shoulder-fired SAMs.97 In 2016, Russia
permitted Armenia to become the first foreign country
to purchase the 9K720 Iskander-M surface-to-surface
tactical ballistic missile system, which can have a maximum range of 500 km.98
Despite these Armenian-Russian military arrangements, a major source of Armenian-Russian tension
is that Moscow has provided even more arms to
non-CSTO member Azerbaijan, which has a considerably larger defense budget and relies on Russia for
more than four-fifths of its arms imports.99 President
Sargsyan called the sales the most problematic issue
in Armenian-Russian relations.100 However, Armenia’s national security policymakers and their Russian
counterparts understand that Yerevan’s dependence
on Moscow compels Armenia to accept the situation,
while Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon resources make these
sales too lucrative for Russia’s military-industrial complex to resist. Some Russians argue that supplying
arms to both sides is not only financially advantageous,
but also gives Moscow greater leverage to avert a fullscale war. Defense Minister Vagharshak Arutyunyan
likewise believes that Russia’s alliance with Armenia
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does help Yerevan deter threats from Azerbaijan and
Turkey.101 Indeed, the possibility of Russian military
intervention on Armenia’s behalf, whether through
the CSTO or more likely bilaterally, is the greatest
deterrent to Azerbaijan launching a major offensive
to recover its occupied territories. The forces in Russia’s Southern MD could rapidly reinforce the Russian
forces based in Armenia. Moreover, by giving Armenia unique access to several Iskander missiles, Moscow
may help sustain a relative balance of power in the
region, despite Azerbaijan’s enormous arms purchases
from Russia and military assistance from Turkey.102
Armenians are also frustrated with other CSTO
members who side with Azerbaijan regarding the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. They have insisted that
their allies are obligated to come to Armenia’s defense
against attacks by non-members. At a CSTO Council meeting in September 2016, then Armenian President Sargsyan said, “Every time the armed forces of
Azerbaijan use various small arms, mortars and artillery systems against the Republic of Armenia, they
also shoot at Astana, Dushanbe, Bishkek, Moscow
and Minsk,” referencing the CSTO clause that military aggression against one treaty party constitutes an
attack on all members.103 Since Azeris refuse to recognize the occupation of their territory by foreign forces,
they have threatened to resort to arms to recover the
region, which positions Azerbaijan as the tactical initiator of renewed conflict. Reacting to the renewed fighting in 2016, Bordyuzha condemned what he called
the “provocative actions on the territory of a CSTO
member state,” which he referred to as the “Nagorno
Karabakh Republic,” a name only used by the separatists, who have declared themselves an independent
state.104
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Yet, the other CSTO members have assumed no
unified joint position regarding the territorial dispute
or the recent fighting. Some hold that the disputed
enclave is part of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized boundaries and therefore outside the CSTO’s
zone of responsibility.105 When Armenia joined the
EEU, it had to accept a provision stating that its membership only concerned Armenia’s UN-recognized
borders.106 Kazakhstan ambassador to Armenia Timur
Urazaev suggested that the CSTO’s role in the conflict
should take the form of diplomatic negotiations rather
than military intervention.107 To the Armenians’ discontent, Belarusian and Kazakhstani objections and boycotts of the CSTO meetings delayed the appointment
of Khachaturov as the CSTO Secretary General, who
should have assumed his position more than 1 year
earlier, according to the scheduled rotation.108 When
Belarusian authorities extradited Armenian activist Alexander Lapshin to Azerbaijan for traveling to
Nagorno-Karabakh, some Armenian politicians called
for Belarus’s expulsion from the CSTO.109 During the
organization’s November 2016 parliamentary assembly, Armenian legislators blocked Pakistan’s assuming
observer status in the organization due to Pakistan’s
support for Azerbaijan’s territorial claims.110 Even
Russia seemed more interested in preserving a balance
of power between Azerbaijan and Armenia than it was
in pursuing Yerevan’s territorial concerns or resolving
the conflict.111 Whatever their displeasure, Armenians
have resigned themselves to accepting this situation
for now in the hope of gaining greater support in the
future.
Armenia has pursued circumscribed ties with
Euro-Atlantic institutions. In recent years, Armenia
has developed more extensive ties with NATO than
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any other CSTO member. Like other former Soviet
republics, it has participated in both NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan and the Partnership for
Peace program.112 Armenia has also sent delegations
to recent NATO summits as observers.113 Armenia has
notably contributed troops to NATO peacekeeping
missions, including Iraq and Kosovo, in addition to
the UN peace mission in Lebanon.114 Defense Minister
Vigen Sargsyan stated:
Over the past years Armenia has been guided by ‘both/
and’ rather than ‘either/or’ principle, and has succeeded
in both military and economic domains. Armenia
interacts with NATO under the Cooperation for Peace
Program and has an Individual Partnership Plan (IPAP)
with NATO. Our peacekeepers are carrying out missions
in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo,
and are present in Lebanon within the framework of a
UN-led peacekeeping mission. Armenia has grown from
consumer of peace into a contributor of it, and it’s a huge
achievement. . . . We have managed to equally develop
effective cooperation with both our strategic partner
Russia and other countries, rather than take sides in the
existing controversies.115

Armenia has also developed additional bilateral security ties with several NATO members, such as Greece
and the United States. China also gives Armenia a
small amount of military aid.116
Former Presidential spokesman Vladimir Akopyan,
who was appointed Deputy Head of the National
Security Service in May 2018, stated that Armenia has
no intentions of joining NATO.117 In any case, Armenia does not meet the criteria for NATO membership,
which requires a high degree of military inoperability
as well as extensive security sector reform. Even so,
Armenia’s engagement with NATO offers the country
an opportunity to present its views on regional security
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issues as well as help keep the alliance from aligning
more closely with Azerbaijan, which has also partnered
with NATO on important security issues. In addition,
NATO helps Armenia with defense training, security reform, emergency planning, and environmental
protection.118 Armenia’s national security community
has expressed confidence that Yerevan can sustain
relationships with both NATO and the CSTO without
controversies.119 In a February 2017 press conference
with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, President Serzh Sargsyan declared that Armenia’s CSTO
membership and cooperation with NATO were fully
compatible: “No doubt, the CSTO and NATO pursue
different goals, but I reiterate that our practice shows
it’s possible that a country finds ways for cooperation
in different formats to ensure its national security.”120
NATO spokesperson James Appathurai likewise said
that, regardless of Armenia’s membership in the EEU
or the CSTO, “Armenia is and has been a reliable partner of NATO.”121
Later that year, however, Armenia abruptly canceled its participation in the upcoming NATO Agile
Spirit 2017 military exercise scheduled to occur in
Georgia. Although Armenia’s participation in that
September 2017 drill was to be mostly symbolic—only
several military health professionals were planning to
attend—Russians had expressed some concern about
Armenia drifting closer to the West and has regularly
objected to NATO military drills in Georgia.122 Moscow
had also objected to Armenia’s planned entrance in
2013 into an association agreement with the EU, which
Yerevan abruptly abandoned when Moscow delivered
US$1 billion worth of military equipment to Azerbaijan, implicitly threatening greater support for Baku
in any future confrontation.123 Russian policymakers
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considered the EU agreement a potential threat to
the Moscow-led EEU initiative. Russian objections to
Ukraine’s entering into such an agreement in 2014 precipitated the collapse of the pro-Moscow government
in Kyiv. In deference to Moscow’s demands for a sphere
of influence, President Sargsyan said, “when you are
part of one system of military security it is impossible
and ineffective to isolate yourself from a corresponding economic space.”124 The Armenian Government is
clearly aware of the geopolitical sphere it finds itself
in, with Foreign Minister Nalbandian observing, “we
are not free to choose our neighborhood, but every and
each state has an obligation to follow certain sets of
universal principles and norms.”125 Armenia did sign
a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in March 2017 in order to facilitate
stronger international ties.126 However, its membership in the EEU will invariably limit the impact of this
decision.127
Despite the May 2018 change in the Armenian Government as a result of the so-called Velvet Revolution,
new Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan affirmed that
Armenia will remain in the CSTO and EEU even as
it seeks to build new ties with Europe.128 Pashinyan’s
Yelk Alliance is pro-Western and had opposed Armenia’s entry into the EEU and subordination to Moscow.129 However, Pashinyan has focused on domestic
reform and sought to temper expectations of any major
change in Armenia’s foreign policy, including in his
meeting with Putin in Moscow a week after he took
office.130 Furthermore, the government will continue
developing the north-south economic corridor from
Russia to Iran to circumvent the closure of Armenia’s
borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey.131
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Republic of Belarus
Belarus and Russia have close and multifaceted
ties. Belarus was a constituent republic of the Soviet
Union. In 1997, Belarus joined the Union State of
Russia and Belarus, which loosely harmonizes the
two countries’ foreign and economic policies. Belarus
depends heavily on Russia for energy, economic, and
military assistance. Moscow provides subsidized gas
and uses Belarusian territory for energy transit and
other commerce. In 2017, two-way trade amounted to
US$32.4 billion, while Russian investment in Belarus is
almost US$4 billion.132 Another geographic link is the
Kaliningrad Oblast, which Moscow has fortified into
an air and naval bastion against NATO activities near
northwest Russia. In the event of a CSTO conflict with
NATO, the Russian armed forces would likely try to
seize the 100 km-wide piece of Polish and Lithuanian
territory separating Kaliningrad and Belarus.133
Russia has stationed up to several thousand troops
in Belarus for years and enjoys access to important military facilities on Belarusian territory. Belarus currently
hosts more than 1,000 Russian troops on its own territory. Through the Joint CIS Air Defense System, Russia
is leasing two airbases in Belarus through 2020.134 Since
2014, in response to increased NATO activity near the
Belarus-Russia border, Moscow has deployed more
warplanes to Belarus.135 The two governments also
share the Hantsevichy Radar Station, which contains
a Russian-operated Volga early warning radar that
can track missile launches across Europe. The Russian
Navy’s 43d Communications Center, based in Vileyka,
transmits orders to nuclear submarines using a very
low frequency transmitter.136 Russia leases a groundbased radar station in Baranovichi, where in the past
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it has also deployed Su-27 fighters.137 Russian officials
have shown interest in acquiring another military base
in Lida, but the Belarusian Government has resisted,
viewing a large internal Russian troop presence as a
potential future threat to the regime’s security.
Belarus is an important CSTO member and contributor. It is the only member wholly in East Central
Europe, positioning the country on the probable frontline of any major Russia-NATO conflict. By law, Belarus
treats armed aggression against any CSTO member as
an attack on Belarus.138 The country has committed its
premier special forces units, the 103d Guards Special
Operations Force and an Interior Ministry special forces
unit to the CRRF. Furthermore, Belarus routinely takes
part in Russian and CSTO military exercises. Recent
examples of prominent joint drills include Rubezh2008, Interaction-2009, Interaction-2012, Vzaimodeistviye-2013, Interaction-2014, Search-2016, and Combat
Brotherhood 2017. Even when the drills occur on a
bilateral basis, they enhance the two countries’ military capacity for potential CSTO operations. Russia
rotates its most significant annual strategic exercise
among its four major operational commands. When
Moscow holds its strategic exercise in Russia’s Western (Zapad) MD, the Belarusian armed forces will participate in the drills, along with Russian military units
based in Belorussia and in Central Russia. The exercise
scenario is often a simulated joint Belarusian-Russian
defense against NATO, sometimes with the overt use
of Russian nuclear weapons.139
Zapad 2017 generated significant anxiety among
NATO analysts since it was Russia’s first strategic
exercise in its Western MD since the 2014 annexation
of Crimea. Given Moscow’s recent use of military
drills as a precursor to foreign military interventions,
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and Ukraine’s lengthy shared border with Belarus,
some Western analysts feared that Moscow would
use Zapad 2017 to develop options for a future conventional invasion of Ukraine or for infiltrating unconventional forces into the country, where they could
generate unrest, engage in sabotage, or otherwise
prepare for a Crimean-style hybrid subversion operation.140 While the Belarusian and Russian Governments
said that only 12,700 soldiers took part in Zapad 2017,
some Western analysts speculated that the number of
Russian troops was significantly higher.141 The declared
figure of 12,700 soldiers conveniently fell just below the
13,000 level that, according to the Vienna Document
signed by Russia and other European countries, would
oblige Russia and Belarus to invite foreign observers.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko defended
the hosting of the exercises from Western criticism,
insisting that, “no one is going to neglect the security
of their government—not Belarus, not Russia, not the
CSTO.”142 Nonetheless, the number of Russian soldiers that were stationed in Belarus as part of Zapad
2017 was markedly lower than in Zapad 2009.143 The
Belarusian authorities encouraged foreign observers to
monitor the drills on Belarusian territory. Lukashenko
insisted that, “We are not hiding and should not hide
anything. If NATO representatives want to be present at our drills, you are welcome.”144 The two countries also have another quadrennial bilateral exercise,
“Union Shield,” based in Russia’s Western MD. The last
Union Shield ran from September 10-16, 2015, on the
Kirylkovskiy and Strugy Krasniye training grounds in
Russia’s Pskov and Leningrad Oblasts. Union Shield2015 involved 8,000 soldiers (1,000 from Belarus), 400
military vehicles (including T-72-B3 tanks, BMP-2 IFVs,
and 2S3 Akatsiya self-propelled artillery), as well as 80
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aircraft including fighters, bombers, and rotary-wing
aircraft.145
Besides protection from potential external threats,
CSTO membership provides Belarus with important
benefits, including subsidized access to advanced Russian weapons systems and opportunities for participation in joint training and high-profile exercises. Almost
all Belarusian weaponry is of Soviet and Russian origin.
In 2017, perhaps as a reward for hosting the Zapad
2017 exercise, Russia reversed its earlier reluctance
and finally agreed to provide Belarus with advanced
Su-30SM fighter aircraft, which will replace Belarus’s
Soviet-era MiG-29s, and Nona-M1 heavy mortars at
favorable prices.146 Belarus partly pursues military
modernization to reduce its dependence on Russia for
security, but for now, defense industrial cooperation
reinforces bonds between Belarus and Russia as well
as with the CSTO.
At least in their public rhetoric, the Belarusian and
Russian national security establishments identify some
shared perceived security threats. Belarusian authorities fear possible infiltration and radical influence from
foreign nationals coming from the Middle East.147 They
have deported dozens of people from North Caucasus
and the Middle East who have illegally crossed the
border. However, Belarus has a small Muslim population and is not a major terrorist transit zone, safe haven,
or target. The growing NATO activities near Belarus
represent a more plausible threat for the country’s military leaders. In public speeches, such as at the annual
Moscow Security Conference, the Belarusian Defense
Minister has echoed Russian views about the threat
of NATO’s military buildup in East Central Europe,
the growing ties between the alliance and non-NATO
European countries, and the destabilizing potential
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of the Ukraine conflict.148 Not only does Belarus lie in
the middle of a potential war zone, but also worsening
East-West tensions have constrained Minsk’s geopolitical maneuvering. The extensive Western sanctions on
Russia and Moscow’s countermeasures have hurt the
Belarusian economy. Due to the influence of Russian
media and other factors, many Belarusians say they
view NATO as a threat.149
At a June 2017 meeting of the CSTO Security Secretaries in Minsk, Lukashenko delivered a comprehensive presentation on threats to Belarusian security as
well as his government’s goals regarding the CSTO.
From his perspective, Minsk’s security was challenged
by great power rivalries, the expansion of NATO infrastructure near Belarus, terrorist groups in Central Asia
and Europe, and the disputes in Nagorno-Karabakh,
eastern Ukraine, and Transnistria. Given this challenging security climate, Lukashenko envisaged five
tasks for the CSTO: 1) coordinating members’ foreign
policies, 2) cooperating with other international organizations, 3) countering international terrorism and
narcotics trafficking, 4) stabilizing migration flows,
and 5) strengthening the CSTO’s defense, politicalmilitary, peacekeeping, and other capabilities. He
insisted that, while cooperating with other actors, the
CSTO members should be capable of resolving these
problems together through their own exertions.150
Despite its reliance on Russia, Minsk has insisted
on national autonomy from Moscow on vital issues
and has bargained hard for Russian aid and other concessions. President Lukashenko, who has governed the
country since independence, has expressed unease at
Moscow’s possible interference in Belarus’s domestic
affairs as well as Russia’s military intervention in Georgia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics. The
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Belarusian Government has deflected Russian interest
in acquiring another military base in Belarus, refused
to follow Moscow’s recognition of the pro-Russian
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, initially supported Ukraine’s attempts to build ties with
the EU, rebuffed Moscow’s request to send official
Belarusian observers to the March 2014 referendum
in Crimea, and affirmed that Belarus would defend
its sovereignty from all foreign threats.151 Belarus has
sought to dilute its dependence on Russia by importing
energy from Azerbaijan, attracting non-Russian investment and trade, and developing security ties beyond
the CSTO, including with some NATO members and
China.152 Lukashenko has leveraged some concessions from Russia by highlighting Minsk’s autonomy
within the CSTO as well. For example, by skipping a
December 2016 summit in St. Petersburg, he induced
Russian Press Secretary Dmitri Peskov publicly to call
Belarus a “close ally and partner” of Russia.153 Russia
relaxed some restrictions on arm sales to Belarus after
Lukashenko made a high-profile visit to Brussels.
However, since Western governments continue to
shun and sanction the Lukashenko government due
to its authoritarian nature, and since defense ties with
China remain tightly circumscribed due to Beijing’s
deference toward Moscow’s security primacy, Minsk
has no alternative except to remain Moscow’s “reluctant follower” regarding the CSTO and other issues.154
Most recently, Belarus has come to accept Moscow’s
annexation of Crimea as a fait accompli and supported
the Russian military intervention in Syria.155
The Belarusian Government has been more interested than most of the CSTO members in using the
organization as a means to counter potential domestic threats. Following a wave of social revolutions
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that deposed some other former Soviet governments,
Lukashenko argued that the CRRF’s mandate should
expand to cover all internal threats to member states.156
After the CSTO failed to intervene in the 2010 crisis
in Kyrgyzstan despite an appeal from the Kyrgyz
President to do so, Lukashenko chastised the other
members, stating “What sort of organization is this,
if there is bloodshed in one of our member states and
an anti-constitutional coup d’état takes place, and
this body keeps silent?”157 Although Moscow decided
against using the CSTO in these earlier cases, Russian
officials might be more willing to employ the organization and other available assets to preserve a friendly
government in Belarus, given the country’s importance
to Russia’s defense. A multilateral intervention under
the organization’s auspices would arouse less foreign
condemnation than Russian unilateral action. From
Moscow’s perspective, Belarus is a more important,
but less pliable, ally than most other CSTO members.
Republic of Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan’s recent military doctrines stress the
CSTO’s value in promoting Central Asian security and
affirm that Kazakhstan will further enhance cooperation with the organization.158 The Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines the CSTO’s objectives as
the “strengthening of peace, international and regional
security and stability, and protection of independence
on a collective basis, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the Member States.”159 The government has
signed dozens of CSTO-related agreements.160 Kazakhstan’s approach toward the CSTO reflects the government’s aim to bolster Kazakhstan’s international
prestige and impact. The Foreign Ministry regularly
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characterizes many of the CSTO decisions and actions
as Kazakhstani initiatives in order to highlight the
country’s importance and influence.161
Kazakhstan does not currently face a conventional
military threat from another nation-state, but transnational security challenges such as narcotics trafficking,
ethnic unrest, Islamic extremism, and natural and manmade disasters present perennial risks. The Kazakhstan Government considers international terrorism to
be “the acutest problem within the CSTO’s responsibility zone and in the world as a whole.”162 Thousands of
Kazakhstani citizens and other Central Asian nationals
have fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and may
return to wage jihad in Eurasia.163 Kazakhstan experienced two terror attacks in 2016 attributed to Islamist
militants.164 President Nazarbayev has acknowledged
“citizens of the CSTO member states join radical groups
and participate in illegal activities in the Middle East
and Afghanistan . . . [which] requires effective measures from our side.”165 During its 2017-to-2018 chair
of the CSTO, which coincided with its membership on
the UN Security Council, Kazakhstan sought to promote counterterrorism cooperation between the two
organizations in support of Nazarbayev’s initiative for
a Code of Conduct to end terrorism throughout the
world by 2045.166
Astana has joined Moscow in pushing to expand
the CSTO’s missions and capabilities. For example,
Kazakhstan backed legal and organizational changes
to enable the CSTO to counter some internal threats
to the members’ governments. Nazarbayev, however,
has stressed that the use of force inside a member country by the CSTO would require the host government’s
consent.167 In 2012, the CSTO adopted Kazakhstan’s
proposed anti-drug strategy, and Nazarbayev signed
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legislation permitting CSTO units to be deployed temporarily on Kazakhstan’s territory, such as for military
exercises.168 That same year, then Kazakhstani Deputy
Defense Minister General-Colonel Saken Zhassuzakov took charge of the CSTO Joint Headquarters.169 In
addition, Astana accepted the decision that all member
governments must consent to the establishment of
non-member foreign military bases on their territories.170 At the July 2017 CSTO foreign ministers meeting
in Minsk, Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Kairat Abdrakhmanov briefed the CSTO members on Kazakhstan’s
efforts to curb transnational cyber and information
technology crimes, including Kazakhstan’s Cyber
Shield initiative. Abdrakhamanov urged greater
cooperation amongst the CSTO members to combat
cybercrimes in Central Asia, particularly within the
CSTO Coordination and Consultation Center. He also
informed the other members about Kazakhstan’s additional anti-terror efforts and the Astana-based negotiations to end the Syrian war.171
Kazakhstan is the second largest contributor of military forces to the CSTO after Russia and has assigned
some of its best forces to the organization. The country
has supported the development of integrated military
capabilities within the CSTO. For instance, Kazakhstan
helped form the CRRF in 2009 for CSTO-wide missions
other than major wars, including peacekeeping, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, managing natural
and manmade emergencies, as well as fighting narcotics trafficking and other organized crime.172 Kazakhstan has assigned its 37th Independent Airborne
Assault Brigade (based at Taldykorgan), a reconnaissance battalion from the 1st Independent Marines Brigade, an aviation group, and other elite units to the
CRRF.173 During the May 2018 session of the CSTO
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Council of Defense Ministers in Astana, Nazarbayev
backed increasing the size of the CSTO Joint Staff to
enhance its effectiveness.174
Kazakhstani national security managers recognize
that the political and security environments of their
neighbors directly impact their own country’s security. At a July 2014 CIS Defense Ministers Council session, Nazarbayev emphasized Kazakhstan’s interest in
deepening military cooperation with its neighbors to
offset unsettling regional challenges such as turbulent
economies, separatist movements, and fallout from
NATO’s drawdown in Afghanistan. He noted that
the CSTO members “had established allied relations,
mutual protection, and total external anti-aircraft
defense” and insisted that they “maintain these relations and confidence in each other” and cultivate their
“joint experience . . . human contacts, common educational field, including in the military sphere, equipment with single type of weapons, as well as common
space protection of external borders.”175 Kazakhstan
has highlighted its ability to render aid to other CSTO
member states, such as Tajikistan, which is seen as
especially vulnerable to Taliban infiltration due to its
lengthy border with Afghanistan.176
Kazakhstan is one of the most active participants in
the CSTO joint exercises.177 The country’s armed forces
have not conducted actual military operations since
the Soviet period, so participating in joint training and
exercises with the more combat-experienced Russian
military helps compensate for this gap.178 From October 8-17, 2012, Kazakhstan hosted the first “Unbreakable Brotherhood” exercise involving the CSTO’s new
peacekeeping forces. Nearly 1,000 troops participated
in the drills that took place at the Iliskiy, Shoshkala,
and Bereg training ranges, with Kazakhstan providing
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more than half of the soldiers. Representatives of the
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the
International Organization for Migration, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the CIS Executive
Committee, and foreign defense attachés attended the
drills as observers.179 Most recently, some 700 special
forces from the CSTO countries joined the “Kobalt2018” anti-terrorist drills in the Alma-Ata region of
Kazakhstan to rehearse eliminating illegal armed
formations.180
The Kazakhstani armed forces benefit from their
ties with Russia. Through the CSTO, Kazakhstan can
enroll its officers in Russian military academies, purchase Russian-made defense equipment at the same
prices as the Russian military, and integrate its defense
structures with those of Russia.181 Recent large-scale
Kazakhstani-Russian arms transfers have supported
development of the CIS Joint Air Defense System
(JADS), which concurrently increase the air defense
capabilities in the CSTO region.182 Russian Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu said that Russia delivered five
battalions of S-300PS surface-to-air defense systems to
Kazakhstan “free of charge with an aim to strengthen
the unified regional air missile defense system.”183
Other Russian arms transfers to Kazakhstan have
included Su-30SM aircraft, Mi-171Sh military transport
helicopters, Mi-35 combat helicopters, a Project 10750E
minesweeper, and a Project 250-class patrol boat.184
Through military-technical cooperation with
Russia, Kazakhstan has significantly improved its
defense industry.185 Interestingly, one reason Kazakhstan strives to develop domestic arms production is
to reduce its dependency on Russia and other foreign
partners. In 2015, Kazakhstan procured more armaments indigenously than from Russian suppliers.186
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Astana has strived to highlight Kazakhstan’s growing
arms industry, as well as entice buyers of these weapons, by hosting an annual KADEX arms show. Yet,
Kazakhstan still relies on Russia to maintain its more
advanced aircraft systems, for upgrading some military systems, and to improve national defense industrial capacity through joint ventures with Russian
companies. For example, a notable 2016 KADEX arms
deal was the Russian-Kazakhstani joint production of
the Ka-226T light helicopter.187 Such joint production
simultaneously advances Astana’s goal of building its
domestic defense industry while also advancing Moscow’s objective of remaining Kazakhstan’s main military partner.
A more contentious issue has been Russia’s continued ownership of Kazakhstani territory for defense
purposes. Since the Soviet era, Russia has been leasing land in Kazakhstan to house seven major military bases and weapons test sites (Kapustin Yar firing
range, Sary-Shagan and Emba missile-testing sites,
929th, Test Flight Center in Taysoygan, the Baikonur
Cosmodrome, Balkhash Radar Station, and a regiment
of Russian transport planes based at the Kostanay
Airport).188 Many of these leases are up for renewal
in 2020, and both parties have been negotiating new
rental agreements.189 Kazakhstan has strived to regain
control of some of these facilities for reasons of national
sovereignty, environmental concerns, and to use some
of the land for agriculture or energy production. Russia
has accepted the joint use of Balkhash and Baikonur
facilities and returned most of the Taysoygan testing
facility.190 Kazakhstani officials have also resisted contributing troops to the Russian military campaign in
Syria.191
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Despite its close military ties with Russia, Kazakhstan has pursued a multivector foreign policy since
its independence that has included sustaining some
defense ties with China, Europe, and the United States.
For example, Kazakhstan regularly hosts annual
Steppe Eagle International peacekeeping exercises. In
2017, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom
(UK), Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan sent contingents to
these drills. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Defense used the
opportunity to affirm a commitment to strengthening
is peacekeeping capabilities.192 Still, Russia will remain
Kazakhstan’s closest defense partner for the foreseeable future. At the opening of KADEX-2018 in Astana,
Nazarbayev stated,
[O]ur country pursues peaceful policy aimed at
strengthening good-neighborly relations with near and
far-abroad countries. However, today’s situation in
the world forces all to strengthen the country’s defense
capability. We try to do the same within the CSTO.193

Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with the CSTO reflects
the country’s precarious security situation, weak military, and close ties with Russia. Kyrgyzstan is one of
the weaker CSTO members in terms of both military
capacity and internal stability. Lacking the natural or
population resources that other CSTO members possess, the Kyrgyz Government has struggled to sustain modern military forces. Political and ethnic strife,
especially between the Kyrgyz majority and the Uzbek
minority, have generated instability. Moreover, Islamist extremist groups have exploited Kyrgyzstan’s
divisions as well as the country’s corruption issues to
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recruit members from among the Sunni Muslim population. Hundreds of Kyrgyz nationals have joined
various militant groups, particularly in Syria, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.194 The Fergana Valley, a territory that straddles Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, has also seen a growth in Muslim militancy.
The Kyrgyz authorities have charged several thousand
individuals with terrorism and extremism and placed
an additional several thousand people under government surveillance.195
From 2001 to 2014, the United States had a military base in Kyrgyzstan. However, Russian pressure
and other developments led the U.S military to withdraw from the facility. As a result, Kyrgyzstan’s military overwhelmingly depends on Russian equipment,
training, and protection. The Kyrgyz Government
adamantly pursues military cooperation with Russia
within the CSTO framework. In August 2017, Kyrgyzstan Deputy Prime Minister for National Security and
Law Enforcement Jenish Razakov and Deputy Chairman of the CSTO Military Economic Cooperation Oleg
Bochkaryov inspected Kyrgyz military plants and discussed establishing joint ventures and production in
the military sector.196 In January 2018, the Kyrgyz Government ratified a military-technological agreement
with Russia to reduce transaction costs and enhance
Kyrgyz-Russian coordination on management, training, and technical collective defense systems.197
Economic ties reinforce Russian-Kyrgyz security connections. Russia is Kyrgyzstan’s leading trade partner,
a major source of foreign investment, a sizeable holder
of Kyrgyzstan’s national debt, and a leader of the EEU.
The Kyrgyz Government has publicly backed the
Russian military campaign in Syria and supported
the pro-Moscow regime of Syrian President Bashar

50

al-Assad. Nonetheless, Kyrgyz officials deflected Russian probes that suggested Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan send soldiers to Syria to monitor the deescalation
agreement that Moscow signed with Iran and Turkey.
The high civilian casualties from Russian air strikes
and the Assad government’s atrocities have engendered discontent among some Kyrgyz.198 In addition,
the Kyrgyz Government has limited funds to support
foreign peace missions. The government also fears that
intervening in Syria could expose them to more Western sanctions. The sanctions on Russia have already
indirectly hurt Kyrgyzstan due to the close economic
connections between the two countries. Nonetheless,
Kyrgyz officials have stated that they might allow professional soldiers (i.e., mercenaries) to serve in Syria to
earn money and gain experience.199
Kyrgyzstan will chair the CSTO in 2019. Due to its
limited capabilities, the Kyrgyz armed forces cannot
render direct military assistance to other countries.
However, Kyrgyzstan contributes to collective security through hosting a major Russian airbase at Kant,
in northern Kyrgyzstan, 40 km from the capital city of
Bishkek. The airbase’s original purpose was to protect
Kyrgyzstan from threats emanating from Afghanistan
and has now become a component of the CRRF. From
Kant, Russian warplanes can patrol all of Central Asia
as well as Afghanistan without refueling. Russia maintains a squadron of Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft, several Mi-8 helicopters, and some 500 personnel
at Kant.200 In 2009, Kyrgyzstan and Russia extended
the Kant lease with indefinite 25-year renewals.201 The
Russian military also has access to some smaller facilities, such as a military communications center in Mailuu-Suu and a naval station in Karakul.202
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Kyrgyz and Russian representatives have periodically considered the idea of constructing another
Russian military base in southern Kyrgyzstan. When
he was Uzbekistan’s President, Karimov strongly
objected to having a Russian base so close to his country.203 Kyrgyz leaders also wanted to limit the foreign
military presence in their country and take charge of
their own security. However, the idea recently underwent a revival due to the deteriorating security situation in Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan’s south, the advent of
a new Uzbekistani Government, and persistent weaknesses in the Kyrgyz armed forces.204 In 2017, Atambayev explicitly supported establishing a second Russian
base in southern Kyrgyzstan.205 The following May,
Sooronbay Jeenbekov, who became President in October 2017, joined other officials in backing construction
of a new Russian military facility in southern Kyrgyzstan to address the threats of terrorism, extremism, and
narcotrafficking emanating from Afghanistan.206 While
affirming that Kyrgyzstan would follow a multidirectional foreign policy and seek better relations with
the EU, Jeenbekov insisted, “Russia is and will be our
main strategic partner and ally, and we will build further upon our partnership.”207 Kyrgyzstan’s improved
relations with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have likely
encouraged security concerns to focus on threats to the
south, but the Kyrgyz Government will probably defer
to Moscow’s wishes regarding a second military base
and other major security decisions.208
Factors that might lead Russia to establish such a
base include combating spillover from Afghanistan,
building influence in Bishkek, positioning Moscow as
a security leader for the broader Central Asian region,
and improving competition with Washington, and
even Beijing, in the region (including the Afghanistan
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conflict).209 However, Russian decision-makers have
other priorities and a strained defense budget. In addition, keeping forces in the Fergana Valley region, where
a second base would be located, is risky given the risks
of ethnic violence between Kyrgyz, Tajiks, and Uzbeks,
as well as the possibility of foreign intervention across
the Valley’s arbitrary and disputed borders.210
Republic of Tajikistan
The CSTO’s contribution to Tajikistan’s security
is critical. Due to its geopolitical situation as the sole
CSTO member bordering Afghanistan and its limited national defense resources, Tajikistan stands as
the member most likely to benefit from the organization. Conversely, the CSTO’s fate may be decided in
Tajikistan—if the organization cannot protect Tajikistan from terrorists, or if the country is overwhelmed
by drug trafficking and regime instability, then the
CSTO’s attractiveness to potential security partners
will decline relative to alternatives like the SCO.
The security situation in northern Afghanistan
has deteriorated in recent years, prompting cries of
alarm by the CSTO members and more promises of
substantial support to Tajikistan. Of the three Central
Asian countries bordering Afghanistan—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—only Tajikistan is a
member of the CSTO. Tajikistan’s border remains the
most vulnerable of these three countries. Its border is
ridged with mountains that serve as natural fortresses
for militants. Uzbekistan’s frontier with Afghanistan
is short and well-fortified, while Turkmenistan has
nearly 100 miles of desert extending from its border
before its major population centers can be reached
(though important gas fields are within reach). In
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addition to the Taliban’s nearby presence in northern
Afghanistan and the constant activities of drug traffickers, ISIS militants present a new threat to Tajikistan’s
security. The country has limited security resources,
porous borders, a weak state apparatus, and pervasive
corruption.211 The weak economy also propels many
Tajiks to work in dismal conditions in Russia and the
other CSTO states. Their remittances make up about
half of Tajikistan’s gross domestic product (GDP). The
country’s harsh economic and political environment
may explain why Tajikistan is the leading source of
ISIS suicide bombers.212
Tajikistani and the CSTO leaders regularly pledge
mutual security support. In September 2016, President Emomali Rahmon and the CSTO Secretary General Bordyuzha, expressing concern about terrorists
infiltrating the Tajikistani-Afghan border, reaffirmed
their commitment to strengthen Tajikistan’s border
forces.213 Although the capacity of Tajikistan’s armed
forces to engage in foreign missions is limited, Tajikistan regularly participates in the CSTO summits,
military exercises, and other activities. The CSTO has
also conducted many counternarcotics operations in
Tajikistan, such as its annual Operation Channel (aka
“Kanal”), which has run since 2003.214 This operation
involves thousands of drug officers, security agents,
border guards, and customs officers from all the CSTO
members, with observers from other governments and
international organizations. The participating governments regularly announce large seizures of narcotics,
drug precursor chemicals, and small arms and light
weapons, which are abundant, given the widespread
examples of armed smuggling and regional strife.215 A
more recent development has been the smaller-scale
“Grom” (Thunder) drills involving the CSTO anti-drug
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agencies, police forces, and security services attached
to the CRRF. Nonetheless, the seizures of narcotics,
particularly heroin, in Tajikistan have declined markedly over the years.216 According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, some experts
estimate the value of narcotics transiting Tajikistan is
equivalent to half of the country’s GDP.217 Tajikistan’s
Drug Control Agency has limited resources and must
confront corrupt local elites who benefit from allowing
narcotics to transit Tajikistan to reach the more lucrative markets in Russia and Europe.
In addition to hosting numerous counterterrorism
and counternarcotics exercises, Tajikistan’s main contribution to the CSTO’s security is hosting, though on
a bilateral basis, Russian forces and military facilities.
Tajikistan has agreed to let the 201st Motorized Rifle
Division (MRD) remain until at least 2042. In May 2015,
Russia sent around 500 troops and helicopters from the
98th Division of the Russian Army to reinforce the Tajikistani-Afghan border.218 In 2017, however, Moscow
reversed plans to send more forces to Tajikistan and
instead reduced the MRD to a brigade-sized unit, with
several thousand troops, possibly due to the need to
reduce defense spending and concentrate resources on
Ukraine and Syria.219 The Russian military denied that
the cut signified any reduction in Moscow’s commitment to regional security and claimed the move would
improve the force’s mobility.220 Russia has provided the
unit with additional BTR-82A APCs, T-72B1 tanks, and
BM-27 Uragan self-propelled multiple rocket launcher
systems.221 Russia’s 670th air group at Ayni Air Base
consists of Su-25 fighters as well as combat and military transport helicopters, which is a considerably less
powerful force than Russia keeps at the Kant Air Base
in Kyrgyzstan. Russia can use Ayni for national and
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CSTO missions, in accordance with its bilateral agreements with Tajikistan, but it remains under jurisdiction
of the Tajik Defense Ministry.222 Under the multilateral
CIS air defense system, the Russian Air Force patrols
Tajikistan’s airspace.223
Moscow is Tajikistan’s leading security partner,
within both the CSTO framework and via bilateral
channels. Tajikistan hosts the Russian 201st MRD,
which is one of Moscow’s largest foreign military
deployments and one of the most powerful elements of
the CRRF. The 201st MRD consists of both contract soldiers and conscripts, and includes the 191st regiment
in Qurghonteppa, the 149th in Kulob, and the 92d regiment in Dushanbe, as well as tanks, armored vehicles,
artillery pieces, and combat and transport helicopters.
These forces regularly exercise with Tajikistani and
CSTO units. The division has been in Tajikistan since
1989, before the CSTO existed. During Tajikistan’s civil
war in the early 1990s, the 201st MRD, having already
been deployed in the country after leaving Afghanistan,
formed the core of a pro-government CIS peacekeeping
force, along with small contingents from Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. During the war, the CIS
peacekeeping force assumed control over Tajikistan’s
porous border with Afghanistan, a safe haven and
source of arms for the United Tajik Opposition. The
peacekeeping force withdrew in 1999, but the 201st
MRD remained. Russian troops continued to guard the
nearly 13,000 km Tajikistani-Afghan border until 2005.
In 2004, Moscow signed a 10-year lease with Tajikistan
that granted Russia exclusive, rent-free basing for the
201st MRD, access to the small Ayni Air Base outside
of Dushnabe, and the use of the optoelectronic control
center at the Okno Nurek airspace surveillance facility,
located in Tajikistan’s eastern mountains. The facility
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detects objects in orbit up to 40,000 km in altitude. In
return for these benefits, Moscow wrote off Tajikistan’s
US$250-million debt and pledged to modernize its
armed forces.224
Tajikistan’s military depends heavily on Russian
weapons and equipment.225 Tajikistan inherited almost
all of its military equipment from the Soviet Union
and, despite pledges of assistance from Russia, the
Tajik armed forces remain outdated and severely lacking in firepower. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia has sold around
US$90 million worth of major Soviet weapons systems
to Tajikistan since 1991, including secondhand, refurbished, and modernized BTR-70M APCs, Mi-8MT
transport helicopters, Mi-24P combat helicopters,
and L-39C Albatros trainer aircraft.226 Russia has also
promised to help develop Tajikistan’s defense industry.227 Moscow has been courting both Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan to deepen security ties, but their joining the CSTO could also prove beneficial to Tajikistan.
Russian officials have periodically announced surges
in economic and military assistance to Tajikistan.228
However, actual deliveries have fallen substantially
short.229 Russian and Tajikistani officials have regularly considered the option of having Russian forces
restore control over the Tajikistani-Afghan border,
but Moscow says Dushanbe has yet to make a formal
request for such a restoration.230
Russian propaganda has had some success in
claiming that Washington colludes with terrorists
and militants. According to a Gallup poll, more Central Asians view NATO as a threat than as a protector. The Tajikistani population is the most anti-NATO
state in the region, with 34 percent of Tajiks surveyed
believed NATO to be a threat, while only 8 percent of
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the respondents viewed NATO as a protector.231 Meanwhile, though the government hopes to benefit from
Chinese trade and investment, the Tajikistani population is wary of China’s long-term aspirations to dominate the country. Tajikistan could become an arena of
limited Russian, Chinese, and U.S. cooperation since
all three countries provide Tajikistan with security
assistance. The United States and China have made
contributions to enhancing Tajikistan’s border security
with Afghanistan and have supplied some non-lethal
hardware to the country’s security and anti-drug agencies.232 China is concerned that terrorists, particularly
Uyghur militants, could employ the region as a base
of operations against Beijing’s control of Xinjiang. Beijing spent approximately US$15 million to construct
apartments for military officers in Dushanbe in 2016.233
Moreover, China has funded the construction of 11
border posts on the Tajik-Afghan border in addition
to a border guard training center.234 Due to the CSTO
and other Russian connections, however, neither Beijing nor Washington are in a position to contest Moscow’s security primacy in Tajikistan. To illustrate, in
March 2017, while the U.S. Central Command oversaw
a counterterrorism exercise involving 150 U.S. soldiers
and 100 Tajikistani soldiers, some 2,000 Russian troops
were engaged in a drill with approximately 50,000
Tajikistani troops.235
Ties with Other Countries
Other countries can formally affiliate with the
CSTO by becoming an observer of the organization or,
less formally, by participating on an ad hoc basis in the
CSTO exercises and other activities. On April 11, 2013,
the CSTO Council for the Parliamentary Assembly

58

designated both Afghanistan and Serbia as formal
observers of the organization.236 The Afghan Government seeks CSTO assistance to strengthen its national
security forces. Several CSTO states also neighbor
Afghanistan and engage in joint border and other
bilateral security collaboration with Afghanistan. The
Serbian Government has been a long-standing security
partner of Russia, engaging in joint exercises with Russia
and sometimes Belarus, and has declared an interest in
working with the CSTO on counterterrorism.237 There
has also been discussion about Iran possibly becoming
a CSTO observer or member.238 Turkmenistan is not a
member of either the CSTO or SCO but could become
a credible candidate for membership in both organizations if the Turkmenistani Government ever abandons
its neutrality policy. Turkmenistan is located between
Russia and China; has historical ties with the CSTO
members as a former Soviet republic; shares security
concerns with the CSTO states regarding, for instance,
Islamist terrorism; and could benefit from Russian
and CSTO military assistance, training, and other joint
projects.
Russia has been open to cooperating with nonCSTO security partners, especially those belonging to the CIS. For example, from May 30 to June 1,
2017, Russia led a Dushanbe anti-terror exercise, the
first large-scale drill held under the auspices of the
CIS Anti-Terrorism Center (founded in 2000), not the
CSTO. The drill involved Russia’s 201st MRD, with
additional military personnel, armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation (including Sukhoi Su-24 bombers
redeployed for the exercise). Maneuvers apparently
focused on combating terrorist groups, countering
illegal armed units in mountainous areas, and peacekeeping with air support. Military engineers; medical
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specialists; and radiation, chemical, and biological
defense specialists, among others, participated in the
exercise.239 These drills stood out for the deployment of
advanced Russian weaponry in Central Asia, including for the first time the Iskandar-M.240 Organizing the
exercises through the CIS as opposed to the CSTO also
makes it easier for non-members, such as Uzbekistan,
to participate.241
Since gaining independence in 1991, Uzbekistan
has stayed aloof from Moscow-led regional initiatives,
especially those that could enhance Russian influence
in Central Asia or constrain Uzbekistan’s foreign policies. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy Concept is defined
by four “no’s”: 1) no foreign bases in Uzbekistan, 2)
no Uzbekistan membership in military blocs, 3) no
Uzbekistan participation in international peacekeeping, and 4) no foreign mediation in Central Asian conflicts.242 Uzbekistan has insisted on its right to engage
with NATO, the EU, and other Western-led institutions, though cooperation has remained limited due
to geography, Western human rights concerns, and
other issues. Although Uzbekistan joined the CSTO in
2006 following its short-lived break with NATO over
mass violence in Andijon, Tashkent still resisted Russian efforts to strengthen the organization’s capacities and missions. For example, wary of giving Russia
additional means to intervene in regional conflicts,
Uzbekistan opposed proposals to deploy the CSTO
“peacekeeping” units in conflicts between or within
member states, including during the 2010 wave of
ethnic violence in neighboring Kyrgyzstan against its
Uzbek minority. In past years, Uzbek authorities have
also criticized Russia’s increased military presence in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.243 Another Uzbek concern

60

was to limit direct ties between the CSTO and Afghanistan that might weaken Tashkent’s influence on its
Afghan neighbor.244
After Russia and other CSTO members ignored
Tashkent’s objections in 2010 and 2011 and rapidly
expanded the CSTO’s authorities and activities, as well
as created the CRRF, Uzbekistan formally left the organization in 2012. The withdrawal notice that Tashkent
transmitted to the CSTO cited Uzbekistan’s discontent
with the organization’s plans to expand its capabilities and missions, Tashkent’s interests in pursuing an
independent policy regarding Afghanistan, and the
CSTO’s failures to address Uzbekistan’s previously
stated concerns regarding these matters.245 The CSTO
officials signaled an openness to considering Uzbekistan’s return at some future date, but meanwhile the
other members enjoyed a freer hand to evolve the
CSTO without requiring Tashkent’s approval. Relations between Uzbekistan and other CSTO members,
including Russia, have improved during the last
2 years under the new presidency of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who replaced President Karimov in late 2016.
Although defense industrial cooperation has expanded
and Russian and Uzbek forces have resumed joint
exercises, Uzbekistani officials insist that they do not
plan to join the CSTO.
Meanwhile, some Russian policies to woo Uzbekistan may cause problems for Moscow’s management
of the CSTO. For example, a November 2016 bilateral
military-technical cooperation agreement allows
Uzbekistan to purchase Russian military equipment
at prices close to the Russian domestic prices, a benefit that Moscow normally offers only CSTO members. Additionally, Uzbekistan representatives can
deal directly with Russian weapons manufacturers,
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bypassing state regulators.246 If Uzbekistan receives
the benefits of CSTO membership without the commitments, then the organization’s attractiveness will
decline.
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
The more cooperative policy adopted by the new
Uzbekistan Government toward its neighbors has created opportunities for closer cooperation, infrastructural integration, and political reconciliation among the
CSTO members. Besides engaging in increased reciprocal presidential visits and summits, the Mirziyoyev
administration has adopted a much more conciliatory
approach toward regional water management, energy
sharing, cross-border travel, and border demarcation.
The disputes between other Central Asian states, such
as between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, have also
recently decreased. The reduction in tensions among
the CSTO members could make it easier for the organization to develop new capabilities and a more coherent
strategy. Meanwhile, if the United States and NATO
continue to reduce their military presence in Central
Asia, alternative security institutions such as the CSTO
may fill the void given the paucity of viable alternative
security institutions. Notwithstanding these favorable
conditions, sustaining the CSTO primacy and the organization’s growing capabilities, missions, and authorities, the CSTO faces major challenges that constrain its
future impact.
Russian Domination
The CSTO resembles a bicycle wheel—its main
connections lie between the hub (Moscow) and the
other members, which have few direct ties with each
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other. Russia’s preeminent position within the CSTO
yields both advantages and disadvantages for the
organization. From the perspective of the other members, having the backing of Eurasia’s strongest military power against external threats can be reassuring.
Yet, Russia has often exploited other CSTO members’
need for Russian security and economic assistance to
coerce them into following Moscow’s military lead.
For example, Russia granted debt relief and improved
conditions for Tajik migrants in return for Tajikistan’s
hosting Russian military forces.247 Moscow’s recent
military assertiveness in Georgia, Ukraine, and now
Syria has augmented unease in the other CSTO members about Russian pressure while, conversely, heightening their fears of arousing Moscow’s wrath.
Opportunities for CSTO membership expansion
remain limited, at least as long as Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan sustain their neutral policies, and other
potential membership aspirants see little to gain by
alienating NATO and empowering Russia by joining
the organization. Although many members joined the
organization to benefit from Russia’s military protection and security assistance, Moscow’s dominance of
the CSTO partly explains the absence of Georgia and
Azerbaijan from the organization. Both these countries
left the CSTO in 1999 due to general concerns about
Moscow’s policies and particular grievances over
Russia’s role in exacerbating conflicts involving these
countries’ territorial integrity: the separatist conflicts
involving the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and the Armenia occupation of the disputed
Nagorno-Karabakh region, as well as large areas of
Azerbaijani national territory. Furthermore, smaller
states have a greater dependence on the CSTO than
larger powers like Russia. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
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for example, depend on the CSTO (i.e., Russia) for
modern military equipment, defense training opportunities, and national protection. Armenia, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan lack the transport and other capabilities to render meaningful security assistance to other
countries beyond their hosting Russian forces and
endorsing their actions.248 Recent CSTO exercises have
highlighted the disparities between sophisticated Russian military technologies and the lagging capabilities
of other CSTO members.249 Moscow, however, relies on
the organization primarily for international legitimacy
and to influence the other members’ national security
policies, which constrains their freedom of action. Not
only does Moscow pressure other CSTO members such
as Armenia to limit ties with NATO, but also in the
West, the CSTO is seen as a Moscow-dominated institution that pursues predominately Russian interests.
Moscow has attempted to counter the perception
of Russian dominance of the CSTO to raise the organization’s international profile, particularly in the
West. Russian and the CSTO officials have repeatedly
offered to cooperate with NATO to manage regional
security issues.250 At an international security conference in 2006, then Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov stated that the CSTO and NATO should combine their efforts to fight terrorism and rebuild Afghanistan.251 In 2009, Moscow sought to exchange the CSTO
cooperation in building supply routes to Afghanistan
through Russia and Central Asia in return for NATO
cooperation with the CSTO on anti-narcotic trafficking and other issues.252 Seeing the CSTO as a Moscowdominated institution and mechanism to reinforce
Russian hegemony in Central Asia, NATO has collectively declined to engage with the CSTO on an
organization-to-organization basis, choosing instead
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to work with the CSTO members individually.253 The
common Western perception of the CSTO is that it is
a Moscow-controlled organization to counter NATO
and strengthen Moscow’s influence in the former
Soviet Union.254 Russia’s efforts to constrain NATO
activities in Central Asia have contributed to this view.
For example, Russia encouraged Kyrgyzstan to end
the U.S. military base at Manas and blocked the U.S.
Central Asian Counternarcotics Initiative to build a
network of U.S.-supported anti-drug centers and task
forces in Central Asia.255 Since March 2014, Moscow’s
annexation of Crimea and support for militant separatists in eastern Ukraine has further alienated NATO
from Russia and the CSTO. Bordyuzha announced that
the CSTO had suspended efforts to establish contacts
with NATO because of the Ukraine crisis, Western
sanctions, and NATO’s alleged attempts to blackmail Russia and its CSTO allies. Instead, the CSTO
announced on April 24, 2014, that it would pursue
deeper relations with the SCO.256 In May 2018, the
CSTO Secretariat, the CIS Counter-Terrorism Center,
and the SCO Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure
signed a memorandum on sharing terrorist information and conducting mutual consultations regarding
terrorist threats.257
Internal Divisions
Disputes among the CSTO members have continually weakened the organization’s cohesion. As
noted, Armenia has been unable to secure backing
from its CSTO allies in its dispute with Azerbaijan
over Nagorno-Karabakh. The organization has also
not taken a position in the dispute among some CSTO
members and non-members over how to delineate the
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Caspian Sea.258 Border conflicts also prevail in the Fergana Valley, an ethnically diverse and densely populated agricultural region divided between Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan’s Parliament
has questioned the CSTO’s viability and usefulness due
to its failure to address that country’s border dispute
with Tajikistan.259 The issue of border conflicts among
member states falls outside the CSTO’s mandate. The
organization can mediate among members only with
their explicit consent.260 Russian policymakers may
reason that these internal conflicts allow Moscow to
exploit regional tensions to advance its interests, since
many of the parties want Russian support against their
rivals.
Despite Russia’s preeminent position in the CSTO,
other members have regularly deviated from Moscow’s stance on important security issues. For example, most CSTO governments failed to endorse Russia’s
military occupation of Georgia’s territory in 2012; only
Belarus followed Moscow in recognizing Georgia’s
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as
independent nation-states. Moscow’s annexation of
Crimea in March 2014, and its proxy war in eastern
Ukraine, have augmented other CSTO member states’
anxieties that Russia might have designs on their own
territories. In principle, the CSTO could send “peacekeepers” to Ukraine under UN auspices. However,
Russian and CSTO leaders have assured other members that it would not press them to deploy combat
troops to Ukraine.261 According to Bordyuzha, “this
will happen only after the use of peacekeepers is recognized as reasonable.”262 Although private military and
security companies are illegal in the Russian Federation, Moscow seems to have been encouraging other
CSTO member states to legalize these groups. The
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advantages of using mercenaries in Syria or Ukraine
include plausible deniability of Russian involvement
in these conflicts as well as obscuring casualty rates.263
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov downplayed
these divisions, asserting that fellow CSTO members
do vote with Russia at international meetings “on questions of fundamental importance.” Lavrov specifically
cited “voting against resolutions on the alleged human
rights problems in Crimea . . . [and] allegations involving the so-called Skripal case,” when Western governments accused Russians of using a chemical weapon
against an anti-Putin Russian intelligence officer.264
One way the CSTO has attempted to temper the
perception of excessive Russian dominance within
the alliance has been to institutionalize the principle
of mandatory rotation of the nationalities of senior
offices, including the Secretary General.265 According to
this principle of alphabetical rotation now embedded
in the CSTO Charter, Bordyuzha’s replacement was to
have been an Armenian. However, members found it
hard to implement this principle in practice. The voting
on Bordyuzha’s successor had to be postponed until a
consensus had arisen on the preferred candidate, and
all the CSTO heads attended the same meeting to allow
for that person’s unanimous endorsement.266
Some CSTO governments have closer ties with
non-members than with their fellow allies. This complication has been most evident in how the CSTO governments have declined to side with their nominal
ally, Armenia, against non-member Azerbaijan. Due
to its hydrocarbon wealth, Muslim population, Turkish heritage, and Armenian occupation of its internationally recognized territory, Azerbaijan has better
economic and diplomatic ties with several other CSTO
members than Armenia. For example, Kazakhstan’s
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absence from the October 2016 CSTO summit, which
delayed the selection of Armenia’s Yuri Khachaturov
as the new CSTO Secretary General to replace Bordyuzha, was seen as signaling concerns about the CSTO’s
aligning against Baku.267
Shirking Afghanistan
Afghanistan is a major, proximate, and acknowledged threat to the members’ security. Yet, while the
CSTO members want the security benefits of a stable
Afghanistan, they have been unwilling to expend substantial resources toward that end. Despite members’
deep concern about the situation in the country, the
CSTO has declined a direct combat role in Afghanistan
and let NATO take the lead international role in rendering on-site military support to the Afghan Government against the Taliban insurgency. Russian leaders
have simultaneously criticized NATO for failing to
suppress the guerrillas and Afghan narcotics exports,
as well as for prematurely reducing the alliance’s
efforts in that country.268 Other CSTO leaders likely
harbor similar anxieties. The CSTO has established a
working group on Afghanistan and has initiated several programs to strengthen the Afghan Government’s
law enforcement and counternarcotics agencies. In
April 2013, Afghanistan received observer status in the
CSTO Parliamentary Assembly.269 The CSTO has also
discussed Afghan issues with the SCO.
However, the CSTO has focused on containing
Afghan threats rather than solving them. The priority
has been limiting the flow of Afghan narcotics, militants, and small arms and light weapons into Central
Asia. For example, the CSTO intelligence, law enforcement, and defense personnel have conducted annual
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Channel campaigns to interdict shipments of narcotics flowing northward from Afghanistan. Non-CSTO
members, including some Western countries, have
supported these operations as full participants or as
observers. The CSTO has also created a counternarcotics center and a database of transnational drug dealers
accessible to Central Asian drug enforcement agencies.270 Notwithstanding these efforts, the CSTO and its
partners have proved unable to intercept more than a
small percentage of the Afghan-origin narcotics flooding their domestic markets.
For now, Russia’s weak economy, military operations in Ukraine and Syria, bad memories of the Soviet-Afghan war, internal divisions within the CSTO
over Afghanistan, and the recently extended U.S.NATO military presence in Afghanistan make it likely
that the CSTO will continue concentrating on securing
the border between Afghanistan and Central Asia. In
the future, the CSTO could pursue several courses of
action regarding Afghanistan—including stepping
up military-technical assistance, returning Russian
troops to the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, expanding its dialogue with Taliban leaders regarding the
mutual threat of ISIS, or even intervening directly in
Afghanistan with Russian or the Russian-led CSTO
forces if the security situation severely deteriorates.
Moscow has shown a willingness in recent years to
deploy forces in foreign countries to uphold Russia’s
perceived national interests, as in Georgia, Ukraine,
and Syria. Russian forces have gained experience from
the wars in Ukraine and Syria that might facilitate
such military intervention in Afghanistan. A complete
U.S. and NATO military withdrawal from Afghanistan could make CSTO intervention more likely unless
the Afghan National Security Forces proved able to
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defend themselves along with Western forces. The
CSTO leaders would also be hesitant to conduct military operations in proximity to NATO forces, given
the complexities of deconflicting such forces as seen in
Syria. A prior reduction in the Russian military operations in Ukraine and Syria would also free up Russian
resources for a possible CSTO intervention in Afghanistan. The KSBR TsAR forces would likely deploy first
due to their enhanced readiness, training, and proximate location, but additional forces would probably
need to follow to secure and sustain a major intervention. However, Russian and CSTO leaders would have
to overcome doubts about the risks of undertaking yet
another failed foreign military intervention in Afghanistan, following on the Soviet and more recent NATO
campaigns.
Shunning Syria
The CSTO has shown neither the political will nor
the operable military capability to advance its interests
beyond the CSTO region. As early as September 2013,
Putin insisted at a CSTO presidential summit that:
The CSTO cannot ignore as serious an issue as the Syrian
conflict. The armed groups operating in Syria did not come
out of nowhere and will not disappear into nowhere. The
issue of terrorism ‘spilling over’ from one country into
another is very real and can affect the interests of any of
our countries.271

In the summer of 2017, some Russian Government officials probed whether the CSTO partners would send
military observers to enforce the deescalation zones that
Russia, Iran, and Turkey established in May in Syria.
On June 22, 2017, Chair of Defense Committee of the
State Duma Vladimir Shamanov said that Russia was
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negotiating with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whom
he noted were both predominately Muslim countries,
to send peacekeeping forces to Syria. Kazakhstan’s
elite forces at least have rehearsed contributing to
UN authorized peacekeeping missions. Russia does
not need a CSTO military contribution to support its
military campaign in Syria since the pro-Moscow government, Iranian, and Lebanese Hezbollah forces provide experienced combat troops. However, a Kyrgyz
or Kazakhstani troop presence could bolster the perceived international legitimacy of any Syrian peace
agreement.
In any case, Abdrakhmanov quickly specified that
Kazakhstan would only send peacekeeping forces
under a UN Security Council mandate. Secretary of
Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council Temir Dzhumakadyrov said that the proposal was raised in the CSTO Permanent Council only as a theoretical option. Kyrgyz
Prime Minister Sakar Isakov declared that Bishkek
would review any formal Russian request for support
in Syria but that such a request, or any official bilateral
discussions, had not taken place. He added that, in any
case, Kyrgyzstan would only send military contractors
or professional soldiers rather than enlisted personnel.
In addition to UN authorization of the peacekeeping
mission, Kyrgyz officials noted that any deployment
would require a unanimous CSTO decision and parliamentary approval. In June 2018, at the opening session
of the CIS Defense Ministers Council, Foreign Minister Abdrakhmanov again denied that Kazakhstan
was in formal talks “with anyone on deploying its service members to Syria,” reaffirming that Kazakhstan
would only consider participating in foreign peace
missions that enjoyed a UN Security Council mandate. The Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz Governments were
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likely concerned about popular opposition to sending
their nationals to a controversial war zone to fight for
an unpopular dictator against predominately Sunni
insurgents. Kyrgyz officials likely worried about the
financial costs of such a contribution, while Kazakhstani decisions probably also feared damage to Astana’s prestigious role as an impartial facilitator of the
Syrian peace process.272
Potentially Competing Organizations
Ties between the CSTO and the SCO have been
increasing in recent years, but still lag substantially
behind, for instance, the collaboration between NATO
and the EU. Cooperation between the CSTO and the
SCO has remained limited primarily to sharing intelligence regarding regional terrorism and narcotrafficking. When they met on the sidelines of the June
2018 SCO summit in Qingdao, China, senior representatives of the CSTO, CIS, and SCO acknowledged
“the need for the further consolidation of efforts and
improving international counterterrorism cooperation” based on “the UN’s central and coordinating
role based on the strict observance of its Charter and
the norms of international law,” while opposing “the
principle of unacceptability of ‘double standards‘,” a
criticism of the alleged NATO approach to international counterterrorism cooperation.273 SCO members
deny that they have collective defense aspirations and
describe its military activities as designed to counter
regional terrorist threats. The SCO also has a much
wider agenda than the CSTO. SCO activities include
promoting regional economic and energy initiatives
as well as humanitarian projects. In theory, the two
organizations could merge, with the CSTO serving as

72

the SCO’s defense component, but China has resisted
the idea. Russian policymakers also presumably like
having the option of conducting military operations
in Central Asia without requiring Beijing’s approval,
which would be necessary for any SCO action.
However, the SCO is also a potential competitor to
the CSTO. The SCO includes all of the CSTO’s Central
Asian members plus Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. Both organizations play security roles in Central
Asia. Since their common creation in the first years of
the last decade, they both have regularly engaged in
training and hold exercises with Central Asian security forces. From Moscow’s perspective, the SCO plays
a strategic role of sustaining Chinese support for the
pro-Russian regimes in Central Asia and is valuable in
terms of showing a united front in opposing the Western presence in the region. Yet, the SCO could provide
the Central Asian states with an opportunity to act in
a multinational manner independent of Moscow by
playing China off against Russia. Moreover, the SCO
could allow Beijing the possibility of increasing Chinese power at the expense of Russia. In contrast to the
Moscow-dominated CSTO, China and Russia share the
leadership role in the SCO. The CSTO clearly stands
out as a military alliance, while the SCO describes its
security activities as focused on counterterrorism. For
example, the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
(RATS) located in Tashkent focuses on information
sharing, coordination, and analysis. The SCO’s numerous anti-terrorism exercises culminate in the large
multinational “peace mission” drills held every year or
two.274 Additionally, the SCO has economic, diplomatic,
and cultural functions that, while not well developed,
provide a different mandate than the CSTO, which has
let the Moscow-led Customs Union and newer EEU
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assume the lead role in these non-military areas. Putin
repeatedly has denied that the SCO would develop
into a full-grown defense organization such as NATO
or that it would conduct military operations. For him,
the SCO’s security role is to “give moral and political support to its members and facilitate exchange of
information.”275 For instance, only the CSTO has military bases in Central Asian countries. Beijing so far has
declined to acquire any foreign combat bases (the one
in Djibouti is described as a logistics base) and insists
that it will not join a foreign military alliance. China
generally avoids challenging Russia by not selling
weapons to Central Asian countries. In this light, Beijing limits its security assistance to uniforms, barracks,
communication equipment, and vehicles suitable for
law enforcement and internal security agencies.276
One similarity between both organizations is that
there is no commitment to Western democratic values.
Instead, the two organizations prioritize internal stability, territorial sovereignty, and non-interference in
the internal affairs of the member countries’ right to
pursue whatever internal political and economic policies favored by their national governments. Although
the CSTO is officially neutral regarding the political
system of its members, membership tends to allow
undemocratic leaders to receive protection and other
assistance from Moscow in exchange for political and
military support. Autocratic governments are pleased
to have a value-neutral ally that does not meddle in their
domestic affairs or censure human rights violations. In
the words of Bordyuzha, “Of course we can play at
democracy as much as we want, but personally, I say
let well enough alone.”277 Another important similarity
between the CSTO and SCO is their common failure
thus far to prove that they can act in crisis situations.
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For instance, the CSTO and SCO were equally inactive
during the 2010 ethnic clashes in South Kyrgyzstan, as
well as the war in Afghanistan. Although the CSTO
and SCO both have concerns regarding Afghanistan,
neither has contributed substantially to resolving the
conflict or helping the Afghan Government suppress
the Taliban insurgency. They both have focused on
sharing intelligence about drug trafficking and Afghan
terrorists with fellow member governments and sometimes with each other.
The strengthening of Sino-Russian security ties in
recent years may facilitate further CSTO-SCO cooperation. Thus far, Beijing has been content to leave Moscow
and the CSTO to police Central Asia. Economic and
energy considerations, rather than security, have been
the driver of China’s increased collaboration with Central Asia. However, as Chinese presence and interests
in the region grow, Beijing may seek a greater security role for the SCO, particularly if NATO withdraws
from Afghanistan and the CSTO appears unable to
defend Central Asia from that regional conflict. Even
with the new EEU and its other regional institutions
and assets, Russia will find it hard to manage China’s
growing economic presence and security stake in Eurasia, which could lead Beijing to adopt a more assertive stance toward the region in coming years.
At some point, Russia might want to integrate the
CSTO into the EEU, just as the EU has tried to develop
an integrated foreign and security structure as well
as partner with NATO. The EEU was formally established in May 2014 by Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan
and began operating in 2015. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan
have since joined the EEU due to their close economic
ties with Russia. Though the EEU is primarily political and economic in nature, Putin has at times said
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the EEU should have a common parliament, passport,
and currency, reminiscent of the EU. Whether the EEU
will have a military dimension depends on the relationship it develops with the CSTO. All current and
intended members of the EEU belong to the CSTO, but
some future members may not. Even if all members
belonged to both organizations, the two bodies may
remain distinct, as the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and SCO were regarding the CSTO
despite their overlapping membership. Yet, the EU,
though primarily a political-economic entity, often has
been driven to pursue a military dimension even when
another body (NATO, in the case of the EU) exists to
fulfill that function.
Uncertain Will and Capabilities
Article 5 of the CSTO Charter provides for “non-interference in matters falling within the national jurisdiction of the member States.”278 However, a few CSTO
leaders have wanted the option to call for CSTO emergency assistance in the event their regime is threatened
by political coups, popular unrest, or social revolutions.279 In 2006, Bordyuzha claimed that, “the treaty
aims to prevent bloodshed and application of force for
solving problems both inside the country and on the
borders with other states.”280 Lukashenko advocated
that members change the CSTO Charter to permit the
organization’s explicit use to suppress internal uprisings and coups.281 Russian leaders have regularly
warned the other CSTO governments of the risks of
the Western-backed democracy promotion and forced
“color revolutions.”282 However, the CSTO has never
undertaken such an internal intervention. For instance,
the organization notoriously stood aloof when deadly
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riots broke out between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in
southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. The organized mass
violence in the Osh and Jalalabad areas of the Ferghana Valley led to the killing of hundreds of ethnic
Uzbeks, while tens of thousands of others fled toward
the border of Uzbekistan, raising the risk of Uzbekistani military intervention in a foreign civil war. Yet,
even after the Kyrgyz Government requested CSTO
assistance to end the conflict, especially the deployment of military police units, the organization failed
to intervene. The CSTO leaders justified their detachment by stating that, since the Kyrgyz situation was
an internal conflict rather than an external attack on
a CSTO member, the organization lacked the legal
basis to send peacekeepers to suppress the violence.283
Although Russian leaders initially seemed open to
considering a more vigorous response, then Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev stated, “[O]nly in the
case of a foreign intrusion and an attempt to externally
seize power can we state that there is an attack against
the CSTO. . . . All the problems of Kyrgyzstan have
internal roots.”284 Similarly, Bordyuzha declared that
the violence in Kyrgyzstan was “purely a domestic
affair,” and therefore, the CSTO would not dispatch
peacekeepers.285 Other CSTO leaders, fearful of establishing a precedent of the CSTO becoming involved
in member nations’ internal affairs, agreed with Medvedev, such as then President Karimov.286 Neither the
SCO nor the OSCE intervened in Kyrgyzstan despite
its being a member of both regional bodies. Medvedev later said that the events in Kyrgyzstan proved the
CSTO needed to respond more rapidly in the future to
similar crises.287 Nonetheless, such intervention would
require the unanimous consent of the members and
remains a controversial issue due to concerns about
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legitimizing intervention in members’ internal affairs.
At present, under most scenarios, one or more CSTO
governments would most likely block the use of the
CSTO military forces to intervene in an internal political dispute within a member government unless it was
clear that some external force was behind the unrest.
Some analysts believe Moscow has tolerated these
ambiguities regarding the CSTO mandate in order to
employ the organization when it is advantageous to
Russian interests and to avoid acting when it is not.288
The CSTO members subsequently amended the organization’s authorities to give it a broader legal mandate
and augmented its capabilities (including by strengthening its rapid reaction forces) to enable the CSTO to
intervene militarily in a member country.289 All the
CSTO members agree on the organization’s responsibility to defend members from external threats. Even
so, the organization’s capacity and will to engage in
military operations is unknown since it has never
engaged in an actual combat operation.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Notwithstanding its weaknesses, the CSTO will
remain a major player in the Eurasian security landscape for the foreseeable future. Until now, the United
States has never developed a comprehensive strategy toward the CSTO. One approach would be for
Washington to work through NATO to promote multinational ties between the two alliances. In principle,
NATO and the CSTO could pool their limited resources
to render assistance to Central Asian militaries,
manage regional conflicts, strengthen border security,
support peacekeeping operations, counter narcotics
trafficking, limit WMD proliferation, fight terrorism,

78

and help the Afghan National Security Forces. Direct
dialogue between the two organizations could also
lead to mutual confidence-building, crisis management, and deescalation agreements. Engagement with
the CSTO can help NATO constrain Russian actions
since some CSTO members would welcome expanded
ties with NATO to dilute Russia’s regional influence.
Another policy option would be to focus U.S. efforts
on influencing the CSTO by primarily engaging with
Russia, since Moscow dominates the organization. The
United States and Russia share some security interests
in Eurasia, such as avoiding a military clash and countering regional terrorism. Washington and Moscow
might also find such a Eurasian partnership useful for
managing Beijing’s rise.
However, for the next few years, significant obstacles render overt U.S.-CSTO collaboration, whether
through NATO or directly, impractical. Ukraine, missile defense, democracy promotion, and other issues
deeply alienate the United States and its NATO allies
from the CSTO. Furthermore, engaging with the CSTO
risks empowering its institutional legitimacy, which
Moscow employs to further its regional military dominance in Eurasia under a multinational guise. On balance, continuing the current U.S. strategy of essentially
ignoring the CSTO is probably the best one, pending
a major change in Russian policy toward the postSoviet space or a transformation of the Russia-China
Eurasian partnership into a more traditional great
power rivalry. Continuing the existing approach of
bypassing the CSTO may be welcome even by some
of the organization’s members, who might favor U.S.
actions to dilute Russia’s military primacy in the
former Soviet Union.
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Meanwhile, the United States and its allies need to
improve their public relations outreach in the former
Soviet bloc. A survey of residents of the former Soviet
republics (except for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)
found that the majority of Central Asian respondents
perceive NATO as more of a threat than a protector,
probably due to Russia’s anti-NATO propaganda.290 In
addition to countering public misperceptions, Washington could target local grievances against Russia’s
heavy-handed presence and policies. For instance, U.S.
messaging could exploit fears in the CSTO states about
being dragged into Russia’s wars in Ukraine and Syria.
U.S. senior officials and officers should also frequently
engage with Eurasia’s non-CSTO security elites. These
efforts should encompass the U.S. combatant commands as well as U.S. civilian agencies. For example, the
U.S. Department of State should receive the resources
it needs to intensify its bilateral and multilateral dialogues with the CSTO members, such as sustaining the
recently launched C5+1 format involving all five Central Asian countries’ foreign ministers and the U.S. Secretary of State. The United States should additionally
provide military, diplomatic, and economic incentives
for Eurasian governments to limit their CSTO connections, or at least eschew anti-NATO policies. They
should further demand that the CSTO members make
their defense exercises and other activities more transparent in order to promote confidence-building and
regional stability, such as by limiting fears of surprise
attack. In all these endeavors in Eurasia, the United
States should cooperate with NATO members and
other partners to amplify the impact of these policies.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AfPak
APC
APV
CIA
CIS
CRDF
CRRF
CST
CSTO
EEU
EMERCOM

EU
EurAsEc
FGA
FSB
GDP
IJU
IMU
IS
ISAF
ISIL

Afghanistan and Pakistan
armored personnel carrier
armored personnel vehicle
Central Intelligence Agency (United
States)
Commonwealth of Independent
States
Collective Rapid Deployment Forces
Collective Rapid Reaction Force
(KFOR, in Russian)
Collective Security Treaty
Collective Security Treaty Organization
Eurasian Economic Union
Ministry of Russian Federation for
Civil Defence, Emergencies and
Elimination of Consequences of
Natural Disasters
European Union
Eurasian Economic Community
fighter ground attack
Russian Federal Security Service
gross domestic product
Islamic Jihad Union
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Islamic State
International Security Assistance
Force
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
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ISIS

JADS
km
KSBR TsAR
MCM
MD
MOD
MRD
MRL
NATO
ODKB

OSCE
PMC
RATS
SAM
SCO
SSM
UAV
UK
UN
USSR
WMD

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the Islamic State, (Daesh, in
Arabic)
Joint Air Defense System
kilometer
Central Asian Regional Collective
Rapid Deployment Force
Mine countermeasures
Military District
Ministry of Defense (Russia)
Motorized Rifle Division
multiple rocket launcher
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Collective Security Treaty Organization (Organizacija Dogovora o
Kollektivnoj Bezopasnosti, in
Russian)
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
private military and security
companies
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of
the SCO
surface-to-air missile
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
surface-to-surface missile
unmanned aerial vehicle
United Kingdom
United Nations
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
weapons of mass destruction
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APPENDIX I
CURRENT COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY
ORGANIZATION (CSTO) MEMBERS
See figure I-1 for a map of the countries that are
current members of the CSTO.

Figure I-1. Map of the Current CSTO Member
Countries1
ENDNOTES - APPENDIX I
1. Image modified from Wikimedia Commons contributors,
“File:CSTO in CIS Map.png,” Wikimedia Commons, the free
media repository, last revised December 6, 2014, available from
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:CSTO_in_
CIS_Map.png&oldid=141607379.
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APPENDIX II
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE
COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY
ORGANIZATION (CSTO)
See figure II-1 for an illustration
organizational structure of the CSTO.

of

the

Figure II-1. Organizational Structure of the CSTO1
ENDNOTES – APPENDIX II
1. Image translated and reconstructed by Madina Rubly from
“Collective Security Treaty Organization,” CSTO website, n.d.,
available from http://www.odkb-csto.org/structure/.
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APPENDIX III
RUSSIA’S MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
TRANSFERS TO OTHER COLLECTIVE SECURITY
TREATY ORGANIZATION (CSTO) MEMBERS
See tables III-1 through III-5 and figures III-1
through III-15 for an in-depth look at Russia’s major
conventional weapons transfers to other CSTO members, by country.1
Weapon
Description

Designation

Year of Order/
Deliveries

Number
Produced/
Delivered

2K11 Krug/SA-4

SAM

1993/1994

9

3M8M1/SA-4

SAM

1993/1994

349

9M111 Fagot/AT-4

Anti-tank missile

1993/1993-1996

945

9M33/SA-8

SAM

1993/1993-1994

40

BRDM-2

Tank Destroyer

1993/1995-1996

4

T-72

Tank

1994/1994-1996

84

9P117/Scud-B TEL

Mobile Surface-toSurface Missile (SSM)
Launcher

1995/1996

8

BM-21 Grad 122mm

Self-propelled Multiple Rocket Launcher
(MRL)

1995/1995-1996

18

BMP-2

IFV

1995/1995-1996

50

D-1 152mm

Towed gun

1995/1995-1996

18

D-20 152mm

Towed gun

1995/1995-1996

18

D-30 122mm

Towed gun

1995/1995-1996

36

Table III-1. Major Arms Transfers from Russia to
Armenia
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Weapon Description

Designation

Year of Order/
Deliveries

Number Produced/
Delivered

1995/1995-1996

200

Igla/SA-18

Portable SAM

R-17 Elbrus/Scud-B

SSM

1995/1996

24

I1-76M

Transport aircraft

2004/2004

2

5V55U/SA-10C

SAM

2007/2009-2010

144

S-300PS/SA-10B

SAM system

2007/2009-2010

2

Tigr

Armored Personnel
Vehicle (APV)

2010/2011

10

Ig1a-S/SA-24

Portable SAM

2012/2013

200

9P78 Iskander

SSM

2013/2016

4

Iskander

SSM

2013/2016

25

T-90S

Tank

2014/2016

1

BM-9A52 Smerch

Self-propelled MRL

2015/2016-2017

6

Igla-S/SA-24

Portable SAM

2015/2016

200

Verba/SA-25

Portable SAM

2016/2016-2017

200

9M133 Kornet/AT-14

Anti-tank missile

2017

Table III-1. Major Arms Transfers
from Russia to Armenia (cont.)

Figure III-1. Russia’s Share of Armenia’s Arms
Imports (1991-2017)
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Figure III-2. Russian Arms Sales to Armenia,
1991-2017 (in millions)

Figure III-3. Russian Arms Sales to Armenia by
Category, 1991-2017 (in millions)
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Weapon Description

Designation

Year of Order/
Deliveries

Number
Produced/
Delivered

1996/1998-1999

4

MiG-29

Fighter aircraft

5V55R/SA-10B

SAM

2005/2006

150

S-300PS/SA-10B

SAM system

2005/2006

4

9M338/SA-15

SAM

2009/2011-2012

200

Tor-M1/SA-15

Mobile SAM system

2009/2011-2012

8

48N6/SA-10D Grumble

SAM

2012/2014

150

9M338/SA-15

SAM

2012/2013

100

Tor-M1/SA-15

Mobile SAM system

2012/2013

4

Yak-130

Trainer/combat
aircraft

2012/2015

4

9M338/SA-15

SAM

2013/2017

100

Tor-M1/SA-15

Mobile SAM system

2013/2017

4

59N6 Protivnik-GE

Air search radar

2014/2016-2020

7/2

S-300PMU-1/SA-20A

SAM system

2014/2015-2016

4

Mi-8MT/Mi-17

Transport helicopter

2015/2016-2017

12

T-72B3

Tank

2015/2017

4

Yak-130

Trainer/combat
aircraft

2015/2016

4

Yak-52

Trainer aircraft

2015/2015

1

BTR-82A

IFV

2017/NA

32

Su-30MK

Fighter Ground Attack
(FGA) aircraft

2017/2019-2020

12

Tor-M1/SA-15

Mobile SAM system

2017

100

Tor-M1/SA-15

Mobile SAM system

2017

4

Table III-2. Major Arms Transfers from
Russia to Belarus
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Figure III-4. Russia’s Share of Belarus’s Arms
Imports (1991-2017)

Figure III-5. Russian Arms Sales to Belarus,
1991-2017 (in millions)
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Figure III-6. Russian Arms Sales to Belarus by
Category, 1991-2017 (in millions)

Weapon Description

Designation

Year of Order/
Deliveries

Number Produced/
Delivered

Project-22180

Patrol craft

2009/2010-2014

3

L-39C Albatros

Trainer aircraft

1995/1996-2000

13

MiG-29

Fighter aircraft

1995/1995

12

Su-25

Ground attack aircraft

1995/1997

14

Su-27S/Flanker-B

FGA aircraft

1995/199-2001

14

5V55U/SA-10C

SAM

1998/2000

40

I1-76M

Transport aircraft

1998/2000

1

S-300P/SA-10A

SAM system

1998/2000

1

Mi-8MT/Mi-17

Transport helicopter

2002/2002

3

Mi-8MT/Mi-17

Transport helicopter

2002/2004-2007

14

Table III-3. Major Arms Transfers from
Russia to Kazakhstan
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Weapon Description

Designation

Year of Order/
Deliveries

Number Produced/
Delivered

2003/2004-2005

14

BTR-80A

IFV

BPM-97

Armored Personnel
Carrier (APC)

2006/2008

18

BTR-80

APC

2006/2008

1

ANSAT

Light helicopter

2007/2008-2009

3

BTR-80A

IFV

2007/2007-2010

79

Mi-8MT/Mi-17

Transport helicopter

2007/2009-2012

12

N-001 Myech

Combat ac radar

2007/2010

2

9M120 Ataka/AT-9

Anti-tank missile

2010/2011-2013

120

BMPT Terminator

Tank/armored Fighting Support Vehicle
(AFSV)

2010/2011-2013

10

BTR-82A

IFV

2010/2011-2012

44

Igla-1/SA-16

Portable SAM

2010/2013-2014

20

Tigr

APV

2010/2011-2012

21

TOS-1

Self-propelled MRL

2010/2011

3

BTR-80

APC

2011/2012

17

BTR-82A

IFV

2012/2015-2017

90

Mi-8MT/Mi-17

Transport helicopter

2012/2013-2015

10

5V55U/SA-10C

SAM

2013/2015

200

Project-10750/Lida

Mine
Countermea
sures ship (MCM)

2013/2017

1

S-300PS/Sa-10B

SAM system

2013/2015

5

Mi-35M

Combat helicopter

2015/2016

4

Su-30MK

FGA aircraft

2015/2015-2016

6

Mi-8MT/Mi-17

Transport helicopter

2016/2016-2017

3

Mi-35M

Combat helicopter

2017/2018

4

Su-30MK

FGA aircraft

2017/2017

12/2

Table III-3. Major Arms Transfers from
Russia to Kazakhstan (cont.)
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Figure III-7. Russia’s Share of Kazakhstan’s Arms
Imports (1991-2017)

Figure III-8. Russian Arms Sales to Kazakhstan,
1991-2017 (in millions)
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Figure III-9. Russian Arms Sales to Kazakhstan by
Category, 1991-2017 (in millions)

Weapon Description

Designation

Year of Order/
Deliveries

Number Produced/
Delivered

Mi-8MT/Mi-17

Transport helicopter

2003/2003

2

Mi-8MT/Mi-17

Transport helicopter

2005/2005

1

D-30 122mm

Towed gun

2014/2015

10

BTR-70

APC

2015/2015-2017

60

An-26

Transport aircraft

2017/2017

2

Table III-4. Major Arms Transfers from
Russia to Kyrgyzstan
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Figure III-10. Russia’s Share of Kyrgyzstan’s Arms
Imports (1991-2017)

Figure III-11. Russian Arms Sales to Kyrgyzstan,
1991-2017 (in millions)
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Figure III-12. Russian Arms Sales to Kyrgyzstan by
Category, 1991-2017 (in millions)

Weapon Description

Designation

Year of Order/
Deliveries

Number Produced/
Delivered

Mi-8MT/Mi-17

Transport helicopter

1993/1994

10

Mi-24P/Mi-35P

Combat helicopter

2006/2006

2

Mi-8MT/Mi-17

Transport helicopter

2006/2006

2

L-39C Albatros

Trainer aircraft

2007/2007

4

S-125 Pechora-2M

SAM system

2007/2009

1

V-601/SA-3B

SAM

2007/2009

50

BTR-70

APC

2015/2016

26

Table III-5. Major Arms Transfers from
Russia to Tajikistan
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Figure III-13. Russia’s Share of Tajikistan’s Arms
Imports (1991-2017)

Figure III-14. Russian Arms Sales to Tajikistan,
1991-2017 (in millions)
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Figure III-15. Russian Arms Sales to Tajikistan by
Category, 1991-2017 (in millions)
ENDNOTES APPENDIX - III
1. All monetary figures used to create tables III-1 through III-5
and figures III-1 through III-15 in this appendix are in U.S. dollars,
data sourced from “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database,” Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, March 12, 2018, available
from https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers, accessed June
25-26, 2018.
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